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Index:
Adler
on Necessary vs. Contingent
Beings
We can infer that a necessary being exists
because the existence of a necessary being is
required as the cause of the existence of the
finite, corporeal, mutable beings we know to exist
all around us.
In order to follow this clearly, you have to
bear in mind the distinction between two
fundamental terms in the argument. The first is the
meaning of the term "necessary being." And I'm
going to use a circle as the symbol of a necessary
being. Now what we mean by a necessary being is a
being which cannot not exist. A being of which it
is impossible for it not to exist. A being whose
very nature is to exist so that its existence
follows immediately from its nature.
To talk about the opposite of a necessary being,
I'm going to use the phrase "contingent being." A
contingent being is a being which may or may not
exist. There is nothing about it which requires
that it exist. Sometimes it does exist; sometimes
it does not exist. It comes to be and passes
away.
You and I, for example, are quite aware that we
are contingent beings, not necessary beings. We're
aware that we are on the edge of nothingness. In
fact, it's only by holding onto our existence that
we don't fall away into nothingness. And that sense
of being surrounded by nothingness, of coming from
nothingness, going back into nothingness, is our
sense of our own contingent being. In other words,
that we may or may not exist. Our natures do not
require us to exist. Existence doesn't follow
immediately from what we are. And all the things
around us are like this.
When you understand this distinction between
necessary and contingent beings, you see one thing
at once -- that a contingent being needs a cause of
its existence at every moment of its existence. For
if its existence does not follow from what its
nature, then something else outside its nature must
cause its existence.
In contrast, the necessary being is one which
does not need a cause of its existence. For what we
mean by a necessary being, let me say again, is a
being the very nature of which it is to exist.
Whereas a contingent being is not a being the very
nature of which it is to exist, and so it needs a
cause of its being, a cause of its existence.
Now that phrase, "cause of existence" is a very
important phrase to distinguish in meaning from the
phrase, "cause of the becoming of something." Would
you think normally that the parents of a child are
the cause of that child's existence? Normally you
would. You'd say, "Yes, they cause the child to
exist." No. They don't cause the child to exist;
they caused the child to come into existence. And
the moment after, the very moment after the child
comes into existence, both parents can die and the
child go on existing. That kind of cause doesn't go
into the very being of the thing. It's external. It
is a cause of the changing of something. It is the
cause of the coming to be or the passing away of
something. A cause of existence must continue to
cause existence as long as the thing exists. And
so, parents are not the cause of the child's
existence since the child may continue to exist
long after the parents do not exist and have ceased
to operate as causes.
I want you to notice that a contingent being is
one which requires the cause of its existence to
cause its existence at every moment of its
existence. Now with these distinctions let me name
three propositions for you about these two kinds of
beings. The first proposition is that contingent
beings do exist. You and I are contingent beings.
We may or may not exist. We come into being and
pass away. We exist. Chairs, tables, trees, cats,
and dogsÑall of these are contingent beings.
They exist. So the proposition "Contingent beings
exist" is true, is it not?
And the second proposition is, from the very
understanding of a contingent being, that every
contingent being needs a cause of its existence
every moment of its existence.
The third proposition is that no contingent
being can cause the existence of another. I didn't
say that a contingent being, a parent, for example,
could not cause the coming to be of a child. I only
said that a parent, which is a contingent being,
doesn't cause the existence of a child. That
parent, so long as the parent exists, also needs a
cause of its existence. I'm only saying now that no
other contingent being can cause the existence of
any other contingent being.
Now one more proposition. And that proposition
is that whenever the effect exists, the cause
required for the existence of the effect must also
exist.
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Adler
on Kant's Moral Basis
Question:
I would like to raise the question of whether it
is even possible to act from such a notion of duty
that Kant says is the sine qua non of moral action.
For example, even when formulating what we consider
to be our duty, we must always consider an action's
consequences and formulate what duty requires in
light of those consequences. Hence, any abstract
notion of duty completely separate from
consequences (and I'm not sure this is what Kant
had in mind) seems to be either impossible to
motivate anyone's actions or to be completely empty
and vacuous.
Response:
If moral philosophy is to have a sound factual
basis, it is to be found in the facts about human
nature and nowhere else. Nothing else but the
sameness of human nature at all times and places,
from the beginning of Homo sapiens, can provide the
basis for a set of moral values that should be
universally accepted. Nothing else will correct the
mistaken notion that we should readily accept a
pluralism of moral values as we pass from one human
group to another or within the same human group. If
the basis in human nature for a universal ethic is
denied, the only other alternative lies in the
extreme rationalism of Immanuel Kant, which
proceeds without any consideration of the facts of
human life and with no concern for the variety of
cases to which moral prescriptions must be applied
in a manner that is flexible rather than rigorous
and dogmatic.
Dogma has a place in sacred theology, but in
moral philosophy it is pernicious and should be
avoided.
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Adler
on Happiness vs. Being
Happy
That fact that everyone has a right to pursue
happiness suggests that happiness is attainable --
in some degree -- by everyone. But is this
happiness the same for everyone? Is each of us
pursuing the same goal when we try to live in such
a way that our lives will be happy ones? To answer
these questions it is necessary to understand the
meaning of happiness -- what constitutes a happy
life.
And to do that, we must, first of all, clear our
minds of certain misconceptions about the meaning
of the word happy. Every day of our lives, we use
the word "happy" in a sense which means "feeling
good," "having fun," "having a good time", or
somehow experiencing a lively pleasure or joy. We
say to our friends when they seem despondent or out
of sorts, "I hope you will feel happier tomorrow."
We say "Happy New Year" or "Happy Birthday" or
"Happy Anniversary." Now all of these expressions
refer to the pleasant feelings -- the joys or
satisfactions which we may have at one moment and
not at another. In this meaning of the word, it is
quite possible for us to feel happy at one moment
and not at the next. This is not Aristotle's
meaning of the word. Nor, when you think about it
for a moment, can it be the meaning of the word in
the Declaration of Independence. Thomas Jefferson
and other signers of the Declaration had read
Aristotle and Plato -- this was part of their
education.
Both Aristotle and the Declaration use the word
"happiness" in a sense which refers to the quality
of a whole human life -- what makes it good as a
whole, in spite of the fact that we are not having
fun or a good time every minute of it.
A human life may involve many pleasures, joys,
and successes. On the other hand, it may also
involve many pains, griefs and troubles and still
be a good life -- a happy life. Happiness, in other
words, is not made by the pleasures we have; nor,
for that matter, is happiness marred by the pains
we suffer.
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Adler
on Ethics: Kant and Mill
Though the ethics of common sense is both
teleological and deontological, it is primarily
teleological because the totum bonum as
ultimate end is its first principle and the object
of the one basic moral obligation -- the obligation
to make a life that is really good as a whole.
Every other good is a means to this end; every
other moral obligation, either in regard to the
goods one ought to seek for oneself or in regard to
rights of others, derives from the one basic moral
obligation that relates to the ultimate normative
end of all our actions.
In order to be both teleological and
deontological, and, more than that, in order
properly to subordinate the deontological to the
teleological, deriving categorical oughts from the
consideration of end and means, an ethics must (a)
affirm the primacy of the good and (b) distinguish
between real and apparent goods.
That is why the ethics of Kant and of Mill only
appear to be both, but under careful scrutiny are
not. While Kant appears to be concerned with ends
as well as duties, he makes duties -- or the right,
not the good -- primary. And while Mill appears to
be concerned with duties as well as with ends and
means, his failure to recognize the distinction
between real and apparent goods prevents him from
making ends and means objects of categorical
obligation.
It would be impossible for organized society to
do justice by securing, both positively and
negatively, the fundamental right of all its
members -- the right to the pursuit of happiness --
unless happiness were a common good, a totum
bonum that is the same for all men. Let it be,
as Kant and Mill conceive it, nothing but the
satisfaction of conscious desires, whatever they
may be, without regard to the distinction between
real and apparent goods; the variety of goals that
men would then pursue in the name of happiness,
many of them bringing individuals into serious
conflict with one another, could not constitute all
together the common objective of a government's
efforts to promote the general welfare. It would be
under conflicting obligations that it could not
discharge.
Only if happiness is the same for all men, and
involves them in the pursuit of real goods that are
common goods, does the pursuit of happiness not
bring individuals into conflict with one another,
and make it possible for a government to secure,
equally, for each and every one of them, their
natural rights.
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