Chapter 2
The Phenomenological Reductions in Husserl’s Phenomenology

The Delphic motto, “Know thyself!” has gained a new signification. Positive science is a science lost in the world. I must lose the world by epoché, in order to regain it by a universal self-examination. (E. Husserl: CM, 157/183)

2.1 Introduction

The evolution of Husserl’s thought did not follow a linear route. Time and again, crucial changes were taking place in its course. The content of fundamental concepts was shifting; successive discoveries of new thematics were happening; incessant expansions of the ever-under-rework teachings to new fields of application were being developed. The evaluation of Husserl’s work in its entirety becomes, thus, an extremely difficult task. The huge bulk of the writings, the multifariousness of their thematics, and the successive reforms and shifts in it make the understanding of even the overall plan wherein the intermediate findings fall very difficult. One thing, though, is certain. In order to overcome all these obstacles to approaching Husserl’s work, we must first deepen our understanding of his method, the phenomenological method of philosophizing. Whatever is said in Husserl’s Phenomenology makes sense and has its value only to the extent that it is a result of ‘the’ phenomenological reduction.

The idea that phenomenological philosophy is possible only on the basis of a phenomenological reduction occurs for the first time in 1905, in the so-called “Seefelder Blätter,” and publicly in 1907 with the Idea of Phenomenology. According to Husserl’s own personal estimation of the situation, from 1913, his understanding of the reduction did not become clear until 1908.1 Until the end of

1See his “Draft,” 59-60/338.
his life, however, Husserl was in fact talking about a multitude of reductions, which, since they are used in Phenomenology, can all be considered “phenomenological.” Moreover, even though Husserl does not explicitly talk in all cases about this or that reduction, he in fact constantly presupposes one. What makes things even harder is that even before 1905, when he was not yet using the term “reduction,” he had already silently put into play some version of phenomenological reduction.

Most commentators have got used to taking it for granted that the possibility of entering the stance from which Husserlian phenomenological philosophizing is possible depends on adopting “the” phenomenological reduction, meaning by this the method that places us in the attitude of Transcendental Phenomenology. That is, in the relevant scholarship, Husserl’s great distinction between psychological-phenomenological and transcendental-phenomenological reduction is lightheartedly rejected. To be sure, in the Ideas I (1913), the first systematic work presenting Transcendental Phenomenology, Husserl himself refers undifferentiatedly to one “phenomenological” reduction. However, as one can see in Schuhmann’s second edition of that work in the Husserliana series, and more specifically in the second volume of that edition (Hua III.2), Husserl subsequently critically reviewed his personal copies of the Ideas I. He, then, complemented his references to “the” phenomenological reduction, making clear that this is actually a double method.

We see there that he in fact splits the seemingly one, fundamental phenomenological reduction of the original Ideas I (1913) into two: the psychological-phenomenological and the transcendental-phenomenological reductions. 2

Among the rare exceptions of commentators who explicitly make this distinction, we must include, e.g., Diemer (1965), Kockelmans (1972, 1987, 1994), and Crowell (1990). We also find explicit mention of the distinction in e.g., in Scanlon (1972) and Sokolowski (2000); the latter, however, refers to them only in order to claim that, in the end, the distinction is merely terminological. And it is still a fact that even in the more recent works, see, e.g., Alweiss 2003, Luft 2004a, b, 2012, no full justice has yet been done to the core of our concerns here. As I see it, the foundation for the correct reading of this distinction was first set out by Fink in his famous “Die phänomenologische Philosophie Edmund Husserls in der gegenwärtigen Kritik,” (Kant-Studien, 1933; here 1970) (authorized by Husserl himself), and later on by De Boer in his unjustifiably forgotten work (1966; here 1978). These latter works also function as the starting point for the view that is going to be developed in this and the following chapter. As will become apparent, though, there are considerable folds in their stories with regard to which I will differentiate myself.

Especially the marginalia and the enthetic pages found in the so-called “D copy” (1929) had the task of highlighting, within the Ideas I, a contrast between a latent Phenomenological Psychology and an explicit Transcendental Phenomenology. See also the editor’s (Schuhmann’s) Introduction in this second edition of the Ideas I (and especially Hua III.1, li-liii). See also note 45 below.

The difficulty everybody faces with the thematic and method of ‘the’ reduction is clearly explained by the editor of the latest (2002) Husserliana volume (XXXIV) on this issue: “One will not find one definitive systematic exposition of the reduction in Husserl’s oeuvre. Part of the confusion this method causes to this day lies in the fact that Husserl never (to his dismay) produced a comprehensive and completely satisfying account of his central methodological tenet.” (Luft 2012, 244). On the other widely known reduction, the eidetic one, which is itself another crux interpretum and is also connected to the very possibility of phenomenological philosophical analyses, see here §2.6.1.
More generally, in the 1920s, Husserl realized that, accordingly, the phenomenological analyses themselves also have this dual aspect. He found out that the psychological reduction leads to a phenomenological \textit{science}, whereas the transcendental reduction leads to a phenomenological \textit{philosophy}.\footnote{See below, especially \S 2.7.} Thus, Phenomenology can be developing either as Phenomenological Psychology or as Transcendental Phenomenology.\footnote{I do not, of course, mean that with this realization Husserl undertakes the task of constructing from scratch two separate new Phenomenologies. What happened was rather a regressive self-interpretation of his course. In order to refer only to his post 1900 works (and until 1929), a number of steps had intervened: the \textit{Logical Investigations} (1900–01), his personal and professional crisis of 1905–06, the painful integration of the transcendental turn of 1907, the essay “Philosophy as a Rigorous Science” for the journal \textit{Logos} (1910–11), the \textit{Ideas} I (1913), and countless pages of research manuscripts on the phenomenological method. All that work demanded a classification and an overall look, through which Husserl could make clear,—firstly to himself—the route of a multifarious work, extending along many years.} For many years and in a vast extension of research manuscripts,\footnote{Rudolf Boehm, editor of Husserl’s \textit{First Philosophy} (1923–24), the second part of which bears the subtitle “Theory of the Phenomenological Reduction” (\textit{Hua} VIII), informs us that the manuscripts dealing with the theme of phenomenological reduction reach the amazing number of 8,000 pages, 4,500 of which are dedicated to the special problem regarding the “ways” leading to Transcendental Phenomenology (\textit{Hua} VIII, xli n. 2). Some more such research manuscripts have meanwhile been edited and published also in the more recent \textit{Hua XXXIV}.} Husserl repeatedly tried to make clear not only the distinction between these two Phenomenologies, but also the special conditions under which they can be realized.

Each of these two Phenomenologies can be carried out from the point of view of an analogous attitude, and we arrive at these attitudes via the corresponding preparative abstainings (\textit{ἐπιθυμαί}) and accompanying reductions (the Greek term he would have used is \textit{ἀναγωγαί}). Both Phenomenologies are possible only through an abstention or a withholding of ourselves \textit{from} something and an accompanying reduction \textit{to} something else. Husserl, however, does not always distinguish these two partial moves as separate constituents of the phenomenological reductions, and, usually, he does not explicitly treat them separately. What is certain is that the analyses of Phenomenological Psychology are made from the point of view of the psychological-phenomenological attitude, which is reached via the psychological-phenomenological epoché (\textit{ἐπιθυμή}) and reduction. In contrast, the analyses of Transcendental Phenomenology are conducted from the point of view of the transcendental-phenomenological attitude, which is reached via the transcendental-phenomenological epoché and reduction. But what do these attitudes actually signify? What do they consist in?
2.2 Outline of Husserl’s Development: Transcendence, “Natural Attitude,” and the Phenomenological Stance

The traditional dipole “internal-external” was recognizing the “external” world as transcendent, in comparison to the immanence of the knowing subjectivity. The world of objects is thus confronted as a universe of self-existing beings that transcends the enclosedness of the bearer of the experiences and of knowledge. Two independent spheres of reality are thus acknowledged, which enter into contact only from time to time, and wholly accidentally. On the one side, we supposedly have the “external” reality and, on the other, the “internal” reality. What is considered as experience and knowledge is the successful incoming and recognition of sensory contents to some suitable sentient ‘chamber’: psyche, nous, soul, mind, intellect, cogito, tabula rasa, consciousness, etc. In some way, the problem of knowledge must find its solution on the basis of a kind of awareness regarding the contents in the soul, mind, consciousness, etc., which should correspond to, refer to, represent, etc., the external source.

Brentano, Husserl’s teacher, had also accepted this basic epistemological idea, and used it in his analyses under the title of intentionality (Intentionalität). Brentano reformulated the epistemological problem in a form which is nowadays known as “Brentano’s problem”: how does the possession of some content, immanent in our soul, guarantee our cognitive relation to outer reality, which itself transcends our immanence and is totally different from this content?

Husserl was, of course, well aware of his teacher’s efforts to solve this particular problem. In his 5th LI, he moreover argued extensively in order to show the failure of the enterprise to bridge the immanent psychic with some transcending and self-existent real realm. The Brentanian intentional contents that reside in an

---

8For these expressions, see Ideas I, 111/105 (in all the following, references to the English translations are followed by mention of the corresponding original text, which can be seen in the List of Abbreviations).

9The Scholastics used the term intentio as a translation of Aristotle’s terminological expression “form, without the matter.” According to the latter, our soul takes on or receives the form of the outer objects, without, of course, taking in itself also their matter (“To have a sensation is to receive the species [or form] of what is sensed, albeit without its matter [‘ yyn σθηναίς ἐστὶ το δεκτικόν τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἀνέφευ τῆς ὑλῆς;’” De Anima, 424a17-19; trns. mine). This “form without the matter” is contained in the sensory organs, or in the intellect or mind, not as something having extensio, but only as something characterized by intenso or intentio (both writings were in use). This, then, is what characterizes mental phenomena: they contain within themselves intensions or intentions (somehow as their objects or referents). Of course, this first realization has since led to a host of accounts and problems in epistemology and in ethics (theory of action).

10The issue regarding the difference in the ways Husserl and Brentano understood the notion of intentionality is very complex, and would demand a separate treatment. The reader, however, may consult I, 557ff/370ff.; see also (Mohanty 1970, 101, 104; Mohanty 2008, 43; Moran 2000a, 40; Moran 1996, 6; Spiegelberg 1976, 120–1; De Boer 1978, 6ff.; McAlister 1976, 151–9; Vassiliou 2013).
immanent psychic sphere should be “related” to the “external” things themselves. Nevertheless, what exactly could the texture of this “relation” be? In the end, Brentano couldn’t find either an adequate analysis for the ontology of the necessary correspondence or reference, or a satisfactory answer to the possibility of misrepresentation.

In the Logical Investigations (LI) Husserl offered his own path-breaking understanding of the notion of intentionality. In experience and knowledge we do not just possess some mere contents within the immanent stream of our consciousness’ living experiences (Erlebnisse). What happens is the following. First of all, the things are offered to us sensorially via their perspectival sides or adumbrations (Abschattungen). These can indeed be said to become immanent contents registered in our receptivity. They can thus be found as psychically real (reell) contents in the stream of our immanent living experiences. Experience and knowledge of the things, however, mean something more and something different. I experience or I have knowledge of a thing when there is an appearance (Erscheinung) or a manifestation of it as a phenomenon in—or, better, to—my consciousness. But this appearing of phenomena is not identical to the mere having of contents that are lived-through as reell recordings in the stream of living experiences. Intentionality is not any more exhausted in this having of representational contents ‘from’ an outer opaque object in the immanence of the cognizing subject. This crucial term should henceforth mean the conscious happening of the manifest appearing of the very beings of the world as phenomena for my consciousness, which, however, lie beyond the stream of its living experiences. Instead of the mere possession of immanent contents that ‘correspond’ to otherwise untraceable external objects, Husserl now talks about an intentional interpretation (intentionale Deutung) or intentional apprehension (intentionale Apprehention) that animates (beseelt) these immanently real (reell) contents of the perceptual adumbrations of the things. It is precisely this interpretation of the immanently lived-through contents which leads to the conscious appearance of the very things in their evident manifestation for me, firstly (i.e., at the lowest level) as whole perceptual beings that are simply sensorially experienced.\(^{11}\)

\(^{11}\)In the following brief passages we come across some characteristic descriptions reflecting the general way in which Husserl treated the traditional epistemological issue. “[C]onsciousness ([intentional] experiences) and real beings are anything but coordinate kinds of beings which dwell peaceably side by side and occasionally become ‘related to’ or ‘connected with’ one another.” (Ideas I, 111/105; transl. sl. md.). “[E]xperience is not an opening through which a world, existing prior to all experience, shines into a room of consciousness; it is not a mere taking of something alien to consciousness into consciousness.” (FTL, 132/239). Also, “Neither the world nor any other existent of any conceivable sort comes ‘from outdoors’ (θύπαθεν) into my ego, my life of consciousness” (FTL, 250/257). Later in this chapter, we will see that, especially for the purposes of these introductory remarks, the fact that we have cited passages from both the pre-transcendental and the transcendental period of Husserl’s Phenomenology is not an insuperable problem. On Husserl’s understanding of intentionality in terms of animating interpretation and appearing, see LI, 355/129, 356/129, 537/349, 565–7/381–3, 591–2/418–9, 607–8/439–441, 610/443, 630/470, 637/478, 733–4/82–3, 741–2/91–3; especially 199/194,
In the Husserlian account of intentionality, consciousness manages, thus, to ‘extend’ itself beyond the Heracletian flux of living experiences and to reach the beings themselves as in-person appearing in the world. With this move, Husserl solves—by actually cutting it like a Gordian knot—what is known as the “problem of epistemological transcendence.” What consciousness experiences or knows has now been put, definitively, beyond consciousness’ immanence. Consciousness experiences and knows the transcendentally appearing beings in the world; not its immanent ideas, representations, or contents of whatever sort.12

But haven’t we just said that only transcendence toward beings as phenomena is gained? What about the relation of the phenomena with what is traditionally recognized as self-subsisting reality, as realistic actuality (reale Wirklichkeit), or even as ‘thing in-itself’?

In the LI, Husserl did indeed basically restrict himself to the examination of the appearance and structure of the phenomena. He felt content enough with the examination of intentional acts and their transcendentally appearing intentional contents (objects). There, instead of engaging in an effort to solve the problem regarding the relation between the phenomena and the supposedly independent, realistic things ‘in-themselves,’ he circumvented the problem of the latter’s existence and meaning of Being.13 In this way, however, the problem we may call the “problem of ontological transcendence” remained unsolved.

In the LI, Husserl did not force himself to speak about anything lying beyond or underneath, as it were, the phenomena manifesting themselves in the sphere of our intentional experiences or, better, in the sphere of transcendent appearances.

309/74, 310/76, 339/109, 568/385, 607/439, where the term Deutung (but also Interpretation) is used and also suggested as synonymous with Auffassung and even Verstehen; The Idea, 56–7/71–2; Hua X, 117; PTP, 179/137–8. For a possible limitation of the validity and scope of this content-interpretation schema of intentional constitution, as it has been thematized in the Husserlian scholarship, see §10.4 n. 12.

12It is especially questionable that Heidegger, who, in his Prolegomena to the History of the Concept of Time, devotes plenty of pages to introducing his students and readers to the three fundamental concepts of Husserlian Phenomenology (intentionality, categorial intuition, and the new conception of the a priori), does not present Husserlian intentionality in the terms presented above. On the contrary, he normally insists in talking about it in the rather Brentanian terms of directedness (sich richten aus), reference (Bezug, Verweisung), and relation (Beziehung) of immanent contents with their transcendent ‘counterparts.’ Thus, Heidegger scholars, as well as Husserl scholars who have been influenced by Heidegger’s reading of Husserl, talk about intentionality qua appearance and manifestation of beings in the world with reference only to Heideggerian intentionality. This, however, is a mistake. On these issues, much more will be said in Chaps. 5, 6, and 7. With regard to the here mentioned “world,” see note 42 below.

13To be sure, the real story is much more complicated. In the first edition of the 5th LI, §7, Husserl actually attempts a Brentanian unjustified claim that Physics actually accesses the real object behind the appearances; that the thing in its (realistic) reality is the object of investigation for the science of Physics—not of Phenomenology. In the second edition (1913) this section was excised. The reasons for this can be found, e.g., in his Ideas I, §52, and their basis will be understood in what follows; see also §§3.5 and 3.6. Regarding my use of “Being” in the context of Husserl’s Phenomenology, see note 20 below.
With regard to whatever could concern the supposedly transcendent ‘cause’ of the phenomena in that sphere, Husserl was rendering obliquely responsible the natural sciences (especially Physics).\textsuperscript{14} In the \textit{LI}, Phenomenology had not yet substantially freed itself from the traditional dualism between the psychical and the physically-real, and was not suggesting any solution to the problem of ontological transcendence (traditionally understood). For this reason, the analyses there are restricted to the sphere of the intentional psychic and its intentional, transcendentally—with regard to the stream of living experiences (and its \textit{reell} contents)—appearing phenomena.\textsuperscript{15} \textit{That} Phenomenology does not raise any ontological pretensions (traditionally understood).

As Husserl admitted in 1906, at the culmination of his professional and personal crisis,\textsuperscript{16} what he had already achieved wasn’t worthy of the name “Philosophy.” Whereas his target was a universal critique of Reason in general, what he had achieved was only a reluctant Eidetic-Descriptive Psychology of perceptual and categorial acts together with their phenomena in the corresponding intuitions. In order to fulfill the remaining, desired work, Husserl needed to find a successful solution to the problem of ontological transcendence. And for this, the coherently followed self-restriction of his Phenomenology until that time had to be overcome. He had to find a way to expand Phenomenology beyond the intentional and transcendent, to be sure, but also merely appearing objects. Necessarily, the route toward the philosophical completion of Phenomenology was passing through a critique of traditional ontology. In other words, what Husserl needed to do was to find a new way to solve the problem of the supposed chasm between the psychical (broadly understood now, i.e., together with the appearing phenomena) and the \textit{realistically} understood being(s).

This problem kept Husserl busy during a course of five lectures (SS 1907), which are well known from their publication in volume II of the \textit{Husserliana} series, under the title \textit{The Idea of Phenomenology}. There, we have the ripening and deepening of his self-awareness with regard to the already-at-work, tacit methodological presuppositions of his pre-transcendental Phenomenology. We have also a first exposition of basic ideas connected with his transcendental turn; ideas that were going to take a more systematically elaborated form in the \textit{Ideas} I (1913). In the \textit{Idea}, Husserl remarks that we live our everyday lives with the background

---

\textsuperscript{14}See previous note.

\textsuperscript{15}It is important to remember that already in his “Intentional Objects” (1894–95) and more systematically in \textit{The Idea of Phenomenology} (1907), Husserl explicitly distinguished between two senses of the expression “in consciousness” or “in the sphere of the psychic.” The first refers to the \textit{reel} or descriptive contents that are lived-through within the immanent time-stream of living consciousness. This is the sense of “contained within.” The second refers to the intentional objectivities transcendentally appearing with respect to the just mentioned stream. This is the sense of “being given to consciousness,” of “consciousness” being aware of what appears to it,” or of “consciously appearing within the sphere of the transcendent phenomena.” See also the last part of §2.5 below and Chap. 4 note 8.

\textsuperscript{16}See, e.g., Spiegelberg 1994, 82–3.
supposition that, out there, there is an ontologically independent, realistic world. Husserl now calls the stance from which we live such a transcendentally naive life the “natural attitude” (*natürliche Einstellung*).

[“Natural attitude” is that] in which everyday life as a whole as well as the positive sciences operate. In it the world is for us the self-evidently existing universe of realities [Realitäten] which are continuously before us in unquestioned givenness [Vorhandenheit]. So this is the general field of our practical and theoretical activities. (*PTP*, 168/288)

The natural attitude appears as the legitimacy-source of common-sense ontology, as the sum of beliefs that for a long period of time justified dualism and created the unbridgeable gap between consciousness and reality in itself. An autonomously or absolutely self-existing “outer” world is supposed to affect (immediately or mediatelly) our perception and to become represented in our mind, to be given to the subject, to be contained in our consciousness, etc., in the maximum possible fidelity and referentiality. For the psychological and the empirical ego, which are definable within the context of the natural attitude, the world is already there as absolutely self-existent. From the natural attitude, the world with its beings as a reality in itself, as ‘something’ realistically standing “out there,” is independent of the subjectivity to which it just becomes manifest, to which it just becomes known as a phenomenon (itself, however, remaining always something ‘more substantial’ than its phenomenal appearance).

This fundamental but also generally implicit universal presupposition of the ontological independence is thematized in §30 of the *Ideas* I, and is called “the general thesis” or “the general positing” (*Generalthesis*). The term “thesis” comes from the Greek infinitive *thetein* (*θέτειν*), meaning to place, situate, or posit something. As Husserl makes clear, the general positing, which defines the essence of the natural attitude, is not a propositionally articulated belief, but a universal

---


18The “natural attitude” (*natürliche Einstellung*) must not be confused with either the “naturalistic” (*naturalistisch*) or the “physicalistic” (*physikalisch*) attitude (as they appear, e.g., in the *Ideas* II). In Phenomenology, the naturalistic attitude simply means taking into account only pre-scientific, a-personal or a-spiritual nature (inanimate extended matter in time, and animate beings). Generally, it may also mean to accept as existent only the objects of the natural sciences. The physicalistic attitude is the attitude from which the ontology accepted by Physics, in particular, is recognized as the sole ontological ground. The problem in this latter case is not how the two separate ontological spheres, *res cogitans* and *res extensa*, are bridged, but how we should treat intentional phenomena on the basis of physicalistic terms (e.g., reductively, eliminatively, etc.). Normally, the “natural attitude” should not be confused with what is ‘natural’ from the *phenomenological* attitude (psychological or transcendental)—there are cases, however, in which Husserl’s ‘official’ use of the term may be confused with the latter use. Moreover, the naturalistic attitude may not only be a methodological or metaphysical stance within the natural attitude, but also a methodological (not a metaphysical) stance within the phenomenological attitude (psychological or transcendental). Even though the same can be applied to the physicalistic attitude, the latter standardly has the meaning of a metaphysical stance within the natural attitude.

19On the references here to a “world,” and not merely to beings or to their sum, see note 42 below.
form of sense-giving (*Sinngebung*) in our intentional relatedness with the world. The general positing is the self-evident filter, as it were, through which we run our everyday lives and grasp the various epistemological and ontological problems regarding our relatedness to the world. In the end, the fact that the world appears to our consciousness is taken, by our natural attitude, as an additional and secondary event, which has no ontological but only epistemological significance.

Transcendental Phenomenology, then, raises the pretension of bringing to light all the concealed conditions for the possibility of the existence of a world for us. It demands to be in the position to describe the structure of its givenness (*Gegebenheit*), but also to clarify the meaning of its Being (*Seinssinn*). For the philosophy under discussion, these conditions of possibility are connected with the concealed intentional accomplishments (*Leistungen*) of the life of transcendental consciousness. Under certain conditions, the examination of the structure of givenness shows that the meaning and validity of the Being of the world with its beings (in sensory experience, in praxis, in theory, and in the evaluative stances of all kinds) are the result of the intentional, constituting functions of consciousness’ transcendental life. Transcendental Phenomenology’s solution to the problem of ontological transcendence is bold and simple. It in fact discovers that there is no such problem at all! The distinction between a psychic sphere of living experiences, of intentional interpretations and of appearances, on the one hand, and of an ontologically independent “external” reality in itself, on the other hand, was nothing but an interpretative prejudice of the ontology that permeates the natural attitude. It is only from the point of view of that latter attitude that such a problem arises.

According to the new point of view established with the passing to the Transcendental Phenomenology, the very world and its beings in their fullest actuality are nothing but the ontological, intentional correlate (*Korrelat*) of a corresponding intentional comportment, within which everything gets constituted according to its whatever Being.

---

20By the terms “Being” and “meaning of Being” I do not mean to usurp any Heideggerian thematic and inelegantly transplant it into the Husserlian corpus. Husserl himself uses the terms many times (especially in the *Ideas* I) and he generally means by them, respectively, that “something is” (that it is a being) and “what we mean when we say that something is.” The capital letter in “Being” just shows here that we should not read it as the infinitive of the copulative “is,” but as the infinitive of the so-called existential “is” (but still in a neutral way that has not yet decided in favour of either metaphysical realism or before-handness or presence-at-handness in the Heideggerian sense, respectively, of *Zuhandenheit* and *Vorhandenheit*—nor, for that matter, of any other sense). The psychological-phenomenological and the transcendental-phenomenological meanings of Being will be further clarified in what follows.

21See also the following sections, especially §2.4.

22This, however, as Husserl self-consciously remarks, does not mean a Berkeleian idealism; reality is not reduced to an idea of the psychic sphere (*Ideas* I, 129ff./120ff., 241–2/230). Husserl also calls Berkley’s idealism “subjective idealism,” “psychological idealism,” “psychomonism,” (*Ideas* III, 63/74) and even “immanent idealism” (*immanenter Idealismus*) (*Crisis*, 231/234; *CM*, §40–41). We will see below what kind of idealism it is.
Of essential necessity (in the Apriori of the unconditioned eidetic universality) to every ‘truly existing’ being [wahrhaft seienenden] there corresponds the idea of a possible consciousness in which the object itself is [constituted or, accordingly,] seized uponoriginarily and therefore in a perfectly adequate way. Conversely, if this possibility is guaranteed, then eo ipso the being truly exists [ist < . . . > wahrhaft seined]. (Ideas I, 341/329)

From now on, between transcendentally understood phenomena and actuality itself (not “in-itself” any more) there is no chasm. The world, together with all its ontological categories and all its modes, according to which it is given to us as existent on the level of the phenomena, is the intentional correlate of this or that conscious actness or actionality (but not necessarily activeness), the at-each-time full noema (Noema) of a noesis (Noesis) which constitutes it accordingly.23

It is in this sense that, from within the new attitude, Husserl thinks that he also solves the problem of (traditional) ontological transcendence, thus upgrading Phenomenology from the level of an Intentional (to be sure) Psychology to that of a Transcendental Ontology, as a complete Ontology of everything. Phenomenology now is meant to speak not just about the world and its beings as appearances, but also about them as complete beings (in a sense to be further specified in the following).

In order to be consistent, though, Husserl had to make clear the method he had followed in order to arrive at the attitude from which these problems were solved (or rather dissolved). If he wasn’t to make his method clear, then all the propositions of Phenomenology would be simply devaluated as—one more—purely speculative system of thought.

23 In Husserl scholarship, and especially in the so-called “Fregean” or “West-Coast Interpretation,” it is a typical mistake to equate Sinn with Noema. Husserl constantly uses the terminological expression “noematischer Sinn” together, of course, with the corresponding “noetischer Sinn.” This distinction and these expressions make it necessary (not only terminologically but also substantially, as will become evident) to keep Sinn apart from Noema (and Noesis). More specifically, Sinn should be understood as the system of the specifications regulating the constitution of an intentional object or state of affairs (Sachverhalt)—more generally: of an objectity (Objektivität or Gegenständlichkeit). On the one hand, these specifications are first set in our empty aimings (at the limit, already in perception; but most clearly in signitive intentions connected with our thinking or talking about an objectity). On the other hand, these specifications are at work on the side of intuitional givenness, when the objectity happens to be capable of being given or it is actually being given in intuition. In such a case, what was at first only emptily intended in a Noesis now intuitionally appears as a Noema. The empty prescriptions (Sinn) that were first set in the empty Noesis have now taken within themselves their ‘material,’ which proved capable of being structured (constituted) according to these prescriptions, and indeed appears as a whole (prescriptions and ‘material’) in fullness as the correlate Noema. See also bellow, and Chaps. 4 and 5.
2.3 Psychological-Phenomenological and Transcendental-Phenomenological Reduction

We said that in the *Logical Investigations* Husserl merely circumvented the problem of the relation between the phenomena manifesting themselves in the psychic sphere with that which—from the natural attitude—is understood as self-subsistent reality. This move was made possible by means of a methodological move that Husserl himself subsequently called “psychological-phenomenological reduction.” This methodological move, which was already regulating the analyses of the *LI* without, however, any explicit mention of it in that work, releases or leaves outside-the-game what, from the natural attitude, was presumed as realistic within or behind the appearing phenomena. The analyses, there, put into brackets the very (realistically understood) actuality—as it is made intelligible from the point of view of the natural attitude and its general positing—without touching upon it. This reduction offers us the possibility of *abstaining from the issue regarding the realistic existence or not* of the appearing thing and of restraining ourselves methodologically to whatever appears as a phenomenon. The happening of the appearing, i.e., the ‘shining forth’ of that which appears in what it is, the intentional recognition of a thing in consciousness, can thus be treated within the limits of the psychological sphere as the sphere of intentional acts and their transcendently appearing intentional objects (as appearances). In this—still epistemologically—orientated Phenomenology, the legitimate propositions are articulated only with reference to whatever is intentionally (i.e., in the manner of intentionally appearing) ‘included’ in this sphere.

The psychological-phenomenological reduction, that is, methodologically transfers the phenomenologist from the realistically understood (in the natural attitude), intentionally appearing, transcendent thing to its intentional-psychological phenomenon or, rather, to it as *only* intentionally appearing phenomenon. In this sense, this move opens up the region of the intentional-psychologically pure consciousness and of the ‘therein’ appearing transcendent phenomena. It discloses the purely intentional-psychological field of (intentional) experiences and their transcendent intentional phenomena (purely and simply). Put otherwise, it high-

---

24 At the time of the *Crisis* (1936) and in a section dedicated to the “difficulties of the psychic ‘abstraction,’” Husserl retrospectively recognizes that, even though in his *Logical Investigations* he “was already pulled into the epoché, so to speak, […] it was not until four years after concluding [that work, the *LI*, i.e., in 1905] […] that I arrived at an explicit but even then imperfect self-consciousness of its method” (*Crisis*, 243/246). Husserl was progressively becoming more and more self-conscious with regard to the non-linear way in which his thought was maturing: “For me, the passing from the first articulation of important theories to their complete intelligibility is always a great step. It takes a lot of time before the various thought-itineraries become friends with one another” (Ingarden 1968, 151; trnsl. mine). This non-linearity in the development of Husserl’s thought creates, of course, a host of problems in our understanding of his philosophy. Nevertheless, we must always take it into consideration.

25 See note 15 above, and the last part of §2.5 below.
lights the field of the intentional, psychologically pure acts and their intentionally appearing intentional objectivities. The mathesis that is thereby inaugurated is called “Phenomenological Psychology” (in the *LI: Eidetic-Descriptive Phenomenological Psychology*).  

However, even if Phenomenological Psychology demarcated a new region of problems that had to be further analyzed, it remained transcendentally naïve. Its interests are restricted to the unity of the intentional acts, to the unity of the appearing objectivities and of their parts, and to their intentional relatedness (later: “correlation”). The transcendental naïveté of Phenomenological Psychology consists in this: whereas it focuses on the intentionally appearing and its constitution, it essentially keeps silently presupposing other realities, e.g., the supposed self-subsistent reality behind the perceptually appearing objects. Whatever appears in the sphere of the psychologically pure experiences was still considered simply as phenomenon of another realistic being, with reference to which the phenomenological psychologist merely suppresses his thoughts and their possible expression. This methodological self-restriction to the phenomena in the sphere of the (intentionally) purely psychic does not solve the problem of the transcendence to the very realistic—whatever this might be—but only demands that the phenomenologist remains mute with regard to it. The latter places the supposed independent reality in brackets, in the sense that it does away with the obligation to form and to express any thought or judgment about it. From this point of view, then, Phenomenological Psychology still moves within the bounds of the positivity that characterizes the natural attitude.

There is at least one additional problem. Phenomenological Psychology, to be sure, abolishes the analysis of the cognitive states (broadly speaking) in terms of a mere having of sensory contents. It establishes the basic conditions for a Gestalt Psychology and confronts all intentional acts in terms of interpretation and evident appearing. Despite the fact that it transforms traditional epistemology, though, Phenomenological or Pure Psychology cannot express itself substantially on the issue of the relation between the appearing and the (supposed) realistic reality somehow ‘supporting’ or ‘underpinning’ this appearing of the phenomena. The psychological-phenomenological reduction leads Phenomenology to the intentional-psychic field of experiences, to the psychic ego and its psychologically-phenomenologically meant intentional appearances (in the sense of intentional “immanence”). From the psychological-phenomenological point of view, the appearance of the beings as phenomena happens, of course, above and beyond

---

26 See also below §2.7 and Chap. 3, §3.4.1 note 16.
27 It is Ehrenfels (1859–1932), also a student of Brentano’s, who is considered the pioneer of this Psychology. Nevertheless, Spiegelberg considers it as a case of simultaneous discovery (Spiegelberg 1994, 133). Husserl, for his part, claims exclusive priority in the discovery of the basic notions of Gestalt Psychology (*LI*, 480/282). Heidegger too accredits this discovery to Husserl (*PHCT*, 66).
28 See above note 15, the last part of §2.5 below, and §4.7.2 note 29.
the stream of living experiences. These experiences, however, are still defined with implicit reference to (and dependence on) an ultimately substantial body, in some psycho-physical connection with it. Husserl recognizes this with clarity in a retrospective, indirect, and self-critical reconstruction dating from 1927.

Even Pure Psychology in the phenomenological sense, thematically delimited by the psychological-phenomenological reduction, still is and always will be a positive science: it has the world as its pre-given ground [Boden]. The pure psyches and communities of psyches [that it treats] are psyches that belong to bodies-in-nature that are presupposed but also simply left out of consideration. Like every positive science, this Pure [Phenomenological-] Psychology is itself transcendentally problematic. (PTP, 96/248–9; transl. sl. md.)

In sum, even though the traditional problem regarding the relation between the intentionally psychic is set aside and left unthematized, the physical-realistic still retains a latent overall legitimacy.

What Husserl realizes in The Idea (1907) and systematizes in the Ideas I (1913) is that there might be also an ‘ontological’ dependence of the world on the consciousness that experiences it. Furthermore, this dependence is now recognized as a problem falling within the jurisdiction of general phenomenological problematics. It is recognized that the world does not only appear to consciousness, but it also is, what it fully is, for a consciousness and thanks to a consciousness. This time, moreover, talk of consciousness changes, and Husserl begins to refer to a transcendental consciousness. These latter transcendental phenomenological findings are made possible in the attitude that is opened up by the transcendental-phenomenological reduction.

In Phenomenological Psychology, whatever concerned the realistically existent within or behind the phenomenon was—at least at first—naively relegated to the natural sciences and, especially, to Physics. Now, however, it becomes clear that

---

29Initially the text read: ‘[. . .] as ground that is understood in realistic positivity or as realistically posited [Boden der realen Positivität]’ (Hua IX, 596). According to Husserl, the science of Phenomenological or Pure or Rational Psychology is, in some way, a relatively easily accessible mathesis, which can function as a propaedeutic step toward the heights of the philosophical—or, perhaps, scientifically-philosophical—Transcendental Phenomenology. Phenomenological Psychology, however, is a science, and since like all the other sciences, it is built and developed on the basis of the ontological prejudices of the natural attitude, it is a positive mathesis that remains in need of transcendental clarification and grounding, as regards the meaning and the truth of its propositions. See also what follows here.

30With the move of the transcendental reduction, a doublcation of the ego seems to arise. On the one side, we speak about a psychological ego. On the other side, a transcendental ego is now introduced. Husserl, however, immediately remarks that this is only a seeming doublcation. Without entering here into the specific issues of the Husserlian egology (in the original eidetic phenomenological-psychological LI, Husserl does not even acknowledge something like an ego), it suffices at present to say that the psychological ego is the ego as seen from the point of view of the psychological reduction, whereas the transcendental ego is the ego as seen from the point of view of the transcenental reduction. See also §2.7 below.

31In Husserl’s descriptions of the natural attitude, there is no clear distinction between a general thesis positing the known empirical reality as independently existing (self-subsisting) and another positing some unknown metaphysical reality as existing in itself. Both may be meant in Husserl’s
these sciences too want to control a truth that is possible only on the basis of a very specific cognitive attitude, the natural-scientific one, the meaning and the presuppositions of which have not yet been clarified. This means that these sciences themselves, instead of being allowed to unquestionably raise the pretension to found all other knowledge, appear to be critically exposed to the need for a clarification of the conditions for their own possibility. On pain of transcendental circularity, as Husserl claims,32 the natural sciences can no longer be blindly and uninterpellatedly trusted to offer the ultimate foundation for what is, and for what we know.

Given, though, that even the supposedly ultimate authority of the supposedly realistic has now been eclipsed, we realize that there is a need for a da capo examination of the problem regarding the real, and of transcendence in general. As already raised in the Ideas I, Husserl suggests that this problem applies only to the context of a very specific stance, i.e., to the natural attitude, and its general thesis or positing. Thus, in order to look at the problem anew, we have to convert our attitude into something new, in order to lift the impasses and paradoxes to which the general positing regulating the natural attitude leads us.

The whole pre-discovered world posited in the natural attitude, actually found in experience and taken with perfect “freedom from theories” as it is actually experienced, as it clearly shows itself in the concatenations of experience, is now without validity for us; without being tested and also without being contested, it shall be parenthesized. In like manner all theories and sciences which relate to this world, no matter how well they may be grounded positivistically or otherwise, shall meet the same fate. (Ideas I, 62/66)

The Phenomenological Psychology of the LI shows that the appearing of the world is the result of an internally cohering unity of living experiences, intentionally associated among themselves in various ways. Now, in the Ideas I, it is realized that the idea about another, self-subsistant reality, an actuality that is understood realistically, is a radically unprovable prejudice of the natural attitude. Phenomenology’s motto “zu den Sachen selbst!” ought to be re-adjusted to the new findings, to become more radical. Phenomenology must continue to remain focused on whatever is intuitionally given beyond any speculation, without, however, limiting itself to just the structure of the phenomena and without accepting phenomenologically unfounded prejudices.

The discovery of the general positing that accompanies the natural attitude and its annihilation by the transcendental-phenomenological reduction allows exactly for the meeting of all these requirements.

No longer is only the dependence of the appearance of the world on an internally coherent context of conscious living experiences considered unquestionable. Its ontological dependence on the structure of intentional living experiences is now

---

32See PTP, 129ff/274ff, 170ff/290ff.
proved equally unquestionable. Every phenomenological unity, which from the point of view of the psychological ego just appears, is now also actually discovered as being (in this or that way) due to the immanent syntheses or intentionally constituting acts of a transcendental ego. Whatever was previously reluctantly recognized as just a phenomenon of some realistically posited dimension now gets upgraded into the full-fledged—and only thusly being—being: it is self-given in its entire actuality, though disentangled this time from any additional positing (as subsisting in itself). From Transcendental Phenomenology’s point of view, no other reality in itself can be legitimately posited beyond this transcendentally constituted being.

The chasm between psychologically meant phenomenon and realistically interpreted being is no longer just overlooked or methodologically circumvented; it is directly abolished—without losing anything crucial at all.

[From that epistemological point of view, then,] nothing is lost when [realistic] existence is put between brackets. But from an ontological standpoint, there is indeed a loss of extra-mental reality. […] [With the transcendental reduction, however,] only a certain interpretation is disconnected [i.e., the one owed to the general positing and dictated by the natural attitude]. Nothing is really lost. Insight into the relative mode of being of the thing eo ipso means an awareness of the absoluteness of [transcendental] consciousness. (De Boer 1978, 430)

After the transcendental reduction, every intentional objectivity appears in what it is as a noema (Noema), i.e., as a transcendental intentional correlate constituted in a corresponding noesis (Noesis) of transcendental consciousness. If the totality of scientific knowledge that is produced in the positivity of the natural attitude is put between brackets, and if the same is done with the general positing that regulates the natural attitude as a whole, then nothing in itself can be sought, behind or within the supposedly ‘mere’ phenomena. Whatever is given in the one or the

---

33See also below, with regard to the role of the so-called “world-annihilation experiment” (§2.4). See also note 42.

34See Fink’s equally clear statement that “the transcendental ‘noema’ is the world itself […] this being itself” (1970, 124), i.e., the actual world with its beings in their actuality understood as intentional correlate of transcendental consciousness.

35Cf. also Diemer 1965, 21ff., 84ff., where, on the one hand, the transcendental reduction comes close to the idea found in De Boer’s passage just above, whereas the analyses concerning the Noema present it as the residue of what was here described as psychological-phenomenological reduction. The bracketing of a realistic being (or of the realistic ‘substratum’ of a being) must be kept clearly apart from the realistic interpretation of a being. For Husserl’s Transcendental Phenomenology, it is only the latter that may also lead to posit something like the former.

36In the psychological reduction, metaphysical reality can just stay in suspension, waiting, as it were, for the possibility of a kind of scientific-realist theoretical insight or theoretical-hypothetical interpretation of its constitution. In the transcendental reduction, metaphysical reality as well as empirical reality is definitely deprived of the meaning “existing in itself;” an ontological meaning like this is no longer legitimate. There is no sense of speaking about a metaphysical reality in itself, and an empirical reality is intentionally constituted in its complete being. There could, however, be some kind of higher-order theoretical hypothesis positing some ‘metaphysically
other degree of evidence and with the intuitionality appertaining to this or that intentional comportment or act, i.e., whatever is given in a noesis-noema intentional correlation (Korrelation), is fully actual. Actuality is a ‘category’ appertaining to the in-person or ‘bodily’ (leibhaftig) givenness of a transcendent correlate—with the pre-predicative givenness of the things in simple sensory experience being most primordial. Realistic actuality or simply reality, on the other hand, is a ‘category’ owed to the general positing of the natural attitude, and is a side-effect of the way in which natural- or nature-things are given.\textsuperscript{37} What is apprehended as phenomenologically transcendent is also considered as ontologically independent—or if not that (because of its subjective ‘phenomenality’), then something in it or behind it, an unknown substratum, is thusly conceived and projected. Characteristic, at least of Husserl’s intentions on how to deal with the issue under discussion, is the following passage from the manuscript B IV 6 (1908).

[It] would not be acceptable for someone to say “there is only absolute [i.e., transcendental] consciousness” as if he or she wanted to say “every other being [Sein] is just something that merely appears [nur ein scheinbares], an unreal semblance [unwirklicher Schein], a fiction.” This would, of course, have been fundamentally false. The nature-objects [in simple perception] are self-evidently true objects; their Being [Sein] is true Being; nature is actuality [Wirklichkeit] in the genuine and full sense [of the term]. It is fundamentally false to ascribe to this Being a measure different than that which this category demands and, thus, to somehow discredit it [i.e., nature], because it is “constituted” within [transcendental] consciousness; because it has its roots in [transcendental] consciousness. (\textit{Hua} XXXVI, 70-1; transl. mine)

Later, in his \textit{FTL} (1929), Husserl remarks:

The true is now the actually existent [wirklich Seiende] or the truly existent [wahrhaft Seiende], as the correlate of the evidence that gives something in its very self [Korrelat des selbstgebenden Evidenz]. Naturally, the actual [das Wirkliche] in the sense of the real [or of the realistic] [des Realen] is merely a particular case [or interpretation] under this broadest [. . . ] sense of actuality. (\textit{FTL}, 127/133; transl. sl. md.)

The ontological Transcendental Phenomenology thus came to decisively complement the epistemologically oriented \textit{LI} (and especially the 6\textsuperscript{th} \textit{LI}). Psychological-phenomenological epoché from the judgments regarding the existence or non-existence of the “external” world, under which the analyses of the \textit{LI} are conducted, had to be abandoned, in order for Phenomenology to attain the undertaking of its responsibilities vis-à-vis all kinds of Being and all kinds of beings. Hence, what one

\textsuperscript{37}On the problem and meaning of the constitution of the nature-thing or natural thing (Naturding) in transcendental consciousness, see Chap. 5.
reads in the *Ideas I* is a reply with regard to the transcendental conditions that make possible, for the first time, something (this or that) to be, i.e., the conditions securing that there *is* something (rather than nothing). Only at this point does Phenomenology become the universal Ontology that Husserl explicitly required it to be.

### 2.4 With Regard to the “World-Annihilation Experiment”

By the year 1936, Husserl had become fully aware of the general criticism that with the transcendental reduction “we are losing the world,” that the phenomenological residuum of the transcendental reduction is nil (sheer nothing). If this were true, it would, of course, mean that at the most systematic moment of his phenomenological philosophizing, Husserl had abandoned or at least overlooked and forgotten the very fundament of his thought, i.e., the very inaugurative idea of phenomenological *intentionality*.

In order to appreciate this point more clearly, an additional word must be added at this point with regard to Husserl’s transcendental turn. Admittedly, the situation described in the previous section already presents great complexity. We cannot, however, avoid a necessary supplement. Husserl’s turn to transcendental phenomenologizing, from 1905 to 1907 up to its systematic published presentation in 1913, does not only introduce the method of transcendental *reduction*. It also signals another major change. Instead of the *eidetic* intentional constitution of the original *LI*, transcendental intentional *constitution* now takes the lead. This change will be further clarified in §2.7, and particularly in §2.7.2. This much, nonetheless, can be told in advance. In the *LI*, intentional constitution means the mechanism according to which “some supra-psychic eidos gets instantiated in the psychic acts and lets us experience the corresponding particular objects.” Transcendental intentional constitution, though, means rule-guided syntheses of hyletic data. In accordance with what we saw earlier, both intentional constitutions of corresponding transcendent objectivities have the character of *interpretation*: the first of the *reell* sensory contents of consciousness, the second of the equally *reell* hyletic data or, simply, hyle (*Hyle*, ὄλη).

In §49 of the *Ideas I*, Husserl explains his analyses regarding the meaning of the transcendental reduction by appeal to the philosophical thought-experiment that attempts the so-called “world-annihilation experiment” (*Versuch der Weltvernichtung*)—a philosophical thought experiment to be sure. There, he claims that with this experiment it is shown that even if transcendental intentional constitution (e.g., that of the perceptual world and its beings) fails, we can still say that, in a sense,

---

38 See, e.g., *Crisis*, 154–5/157–8; also *Hua* VIII, 164.
transcendental consciousness ‘exists.’ In this sense, Husserl proclaims the absolute existence or Being of consciousness, in comparison with the dependent existence or Being of the world and its beings.39

In this way, however, the false impression may be created that the aim of transcendental reduction is the successful carrying out of that world-annihilation experiment, so that, after it, we remain with the absolute transcendental consciousness. Nevertheless, the world-annihilation experiment is not the transcendental reduction. And the experiment’s conclusion, that it is possible to imagine the annihilation of the world with transcendental consciousness remaining at the same time intact (hence, as absolute), does not describe the total result of transcendental reduction.

When Husserl claims that after the world-annihilation experiment, someone can say that absolute consciousness remains as residuum, what he means is that what remains is a field of immanent possibilities of time-syntheses, which, under certain conditions, could result in the constitution of intentional correlations in which we could find ourselves in the conscious givenness of corresponding, appearing, transcendent beings in their world. The dimension of that field of possibilities for intentional syntheses is also called “functioning intentionality” (fungierende Intentionalität) or functioning consciousness,40 a field of time-syntheses where the hyletic data contained in the stream of living experiences get synthesized in rule-governed ways that let us experience transcendentally appearing intentional objects. As we know, for Husserl, these syntheses are at bottom anonymous, passive, and pre-predicative. Upon them, actively thematizing, predicative, idealizing, etc., syntheses are founded. Within its possible excessiveness, the world-annihilation experiment wants only to bring to the surface the concealed (actual or potential) intentional accomplishments (Leistungen) that keep us always in the context of a conscious intentional correlation, in which we have always already somehow encountered beings in a world-horizon.

Transcendental reduction is the lifting of the general positing, i.e., the definite cessation of the absolutizing transcendent apprehension of the world (absolutorierende Weltapperzeption), of the prejudice of the natural attitude according to which the “external” transcendent world (or a substratum of it) is also considered as absolute (absolutely or realistically existing). The transcendental re-interpretation of the status of the world opens us up to an experience in which the world is apprehended and given as constituted in intentional correlations. And the lifting of the general positing does not annihilate the world, but leaves us with the world ‘inside’ consciousness or, to put it strictly phenomenologically (avoiding traditional

39This concept of “absoluteness,” in Husserl, has an ontological rather than a mere epistemological sense; it is used in order to determine not that which contains certainties, but that whose existence does not depend on something else. On the persuasiveness of the world-annihilation experiment and on the absoluteness of transcendental consciousness, see also §2.7 in this chapter, and Chap. 10.

40See, e.g., CM, 48/85, 54/90, 64/99; Crisis, 112–3/114–6, 182ff/185ff.
2.4 With Regard to the “World-Annihilation Experiment” 35
terminology), with consciousness out there in the world. The world-annihilation
experiment is a helpful clarification; it plays the role of the ‘pathological’ case,
which offers us the possibility of seeing, for the first time, the unexamined
presuppositions of the normal case. The idea is that, if transcendental consciousness
was malfunctioning, no world with objects would appear, but instead only partial
fragments of unavailable appropriate wholes, or even nothing at all. Hence, the
effectual appearing actual beings in the actual world are the achievement of the
intentionally, harmoniously synthesizing, transcendental consciousness.

In Transcendental Phenomenology, instead of aiming at the annihilation of
the world or at our withdrawal and encaging of ourselves within a self-enclosed
sphere (a traditionally immanent consciousness), what is attempted is the persuasive
entrenchment of the possibility of intentional transcendence. It is now shown that,
in the end, intentionality concerns, constitutes, and controls the whole actual world
in its Being and with its beings. With the transcendental turn, Husserl, instead of
remaining caught in the happening of the appearing of the world and its beings as
enjoying the status of unexamined ‘reality,’ shows a way of re-claiming and re-
gaining the world and its beings in their ontological completeness. With the help
of the world-annihilation experiment, the transcendental reduction, instead of being
a stepping back toward the intentional immanence of the constituting functions,
is proved to be a ‘marching’ ahead toward the world and its beings in a full-
fledged ontological ‘robustness,’ by means of an enhancement of the meaning of
intentionality. Ricoeur, for instance, has a similarly positive view of the world-
annihilation experiment.

The possibility that the world does not exist is not the possibility that perception is a dream,
or a picture, but that the variety of adumbrations does not come to a unity at all and is
radically discordant. It is the harmony of the adumbrations of things that is contingent.
This is absolutely new in relation to Descartes and does not contradict the principle of
intentionality, since what would be discordant is a series of intentionalities. (Ricoeur 1996,
103)

41On this, see note 15 above here (transcribing the relevant points into the present transcendental
milieu); also here, §2.6.
42“I must lose the world by epoché, in order to regain it by a universal self-examination.” (CM,
157/183). Especially with the notion of the world, an important point showing that Husserl had a
good understanding of it qua horizon of givenness of beings that inhabit it, according to its form
or essence (worldliness), is Ideas I, §§27–30. There, Husserl describes the phenomenology of the
givenness of the world in the natural attitude. However, since the reduction basically transforms
the meaning of Being of the world and of what is given in it, without annihilating or losing it
itself in any worrying sense, what is said there holds—mutatis mutandis—equally well for the
reduced world. Fink especially has particularly emphasized not just the equiprimordiality of the
(regional and specific) forms of beings and the world-form, but—probably under the influence
of Heidegger—the absolute priority of the world-form as something ‘co-extensive’ with the
constituting possibilities of the absolute transcendental consciousness. See Fink [1970], 140–1,
110–1, 135ff., and especially 137–8. See also Chap. 3, note 33.
This ascertains that transcendental reduction does not lead us to nil, to the empty nothing. On the contrary, as we saw above, it leads us to the world and its beings, qua transcendental phenomenon and, moreover, as an actuality that has been freed from the absolutizing apprehension imposed by the natural attitude. That the world-annihilation experiment does not contradict the principle of intentionality means that transcendental subjectivity does not in any way lose its intentional relatedness with the world itself (not “in itself”).

Transcendental Phenomenology is not a speculative theory that is built under the condition of the absolute zero, which the possible absence of the world would amount to. Its claims and its arguments do not presuppose our transference to an empty immanent ‘space’ from which the world itself would be totally absent, just because, as someone may think, it (the world) would contaminate the purity of absolute consciousness with factic contingencies. The only thing that Husserl demands is to be able to intuitionally, i.e., phenomenologically and not merely discursively-speculatively, show that the world and its beings, qua unitary phenomena, are indeed unities appearing in their actuality to our experience, within which our theoretical and praxial comportments are developed. They appear and are there for us in their actuality and with whatever givenness because, at bottom, the adumbrations of the things get unified in concordant unities, on the basis of the functioning intentional syntheses. This means that, at bottom, the harmonic unification of adumbrations and things—or, more generally, of partial contents in the concordances of the corresponding appearing wholes—is something that may or may not happen. Consciousness, however, as the possibility of all this, does not depend on what appears in such a way as actual intentional correlate.

This is exactly the point which the world-annihilation experiment brings to our attention. Indeed, Husserl shows by it that the fact that there is world and beings in it is the result of intentional constitutions. If the functioning consciousness were not achieving harmonic, unitary syntheses, then we would not experience anything; nothing could appear and be there for us. Hence, when the transcendental issue is posed in such terms, i.e., in terms regarding the relative priority of consciousness or of ‘Being,’ it becomes—in a phenomenological, non-speculative way—totally clear that consciousness precedes ‘Being’ or, in order to be more faithful to the meaning of the world-annihilation experiment, consciousness and ‘Being’ are equiprimordial. Even in its non-harmonious and phenomenologically unsuccessful intentional functionings, consciousness passively and anonymously strives and struggles, as it were, for meaningfulness and truthfulness, for intelligible and appearing correlates, i.e., for beings in a world.

---

43 On these processes, see Chaps. 4 and 5.
44 On this, see also Chap. 4 and Theodorou 2010b.
2.5 Transcendental Reduction as Widening and as Radicalization of the Psychological Reduction

In the *Ideas I*, the first systematic exposition of Transcendental Phenomenology, Husserl had not yet made explicit the distinction between the psychological and transcendental reduction. In actual fact, he used similar and sometimes identical expressions in order to refer to methodological moves and functions belonging to either of the two. This rendered extremely difficult any possible attempt to coherently understand the phenomenological method and point of view. Even during the early and mid-1920s, Husserl did not have a fully crystalized way of presenting the distinction between the psychological and the transcendental phenomenological reduction. In one way or another and to one degree or another, he was continually tormented by unclarities and ambivalences. The situation seems to become clearer only during the final years of that decade.45

Both of the reductions under discussion here are “phenomenological.” Both contain the first step of a phenomenological epoché. Both contain the move of putting something out of play. Both deactivate or interrupt (ausschalten) something, etc. However, these moves have different meanings, different scopes, different presuppositions, a different range, etc. An example of how problematic it remained—even for the Husserl of the late 1920s—to express the subtle but serious difference between the psychological and the transcendental reduction, is to be found in the public “Amsterdam Vorträge,” a text written as late as 1928.46

The phenomenological-psychological reduction is for him [for the phenomenological psychologist] a method of limiting the real psychic [das real Seelische] and, above all, the intentional life to its proper essence [Eigenwesentliches], by putting out of play [Außer-spiel-setzen] or leaving out of account [Außer-Rechnung-stellen] the transcendent posittings at work in this life. *(PTP, 246/340)*; transl. md.)

45 More specifically, in the publications of the *Ideas I*, which appeared when Husserl was still alive, the distinction between the two reductions under discussion wasn’t explicit. Only in the 1925 and 1929 *marginalia* on his personal copies of that work does Husserl seem to come closer to a clearer distinction of the one “phenomenological” reduction into a phenomenological-psychological and a phenomenological transcendental reduction. Biemel’s *Husserliana* publication of Husserl’s *Ideas I* (*Hua* III) incorporated some of these marginalia in a rather unsuccessful and confusing way. It was Schuhmann’s *Husserliana* re-publication of the original *Ideas I* (*Hua* III.1), together with a separate volume containing Husserl’s *marginalia* and supplemental manuscripts (*Hua* III.2), that prepared the ground for a better re-interpretation of “the” phenomenological reduction. In addition, the texts that are immediately or mediately related with the notorious “*Britannica* Article” project make this complicated issue much clearer (see what follows). For the restoration of the complete picture on the issue discussed here, the reader should, nonetheless, be patient until the closing of §2.7 of the present chapter.

46 This can be also seen in the strictly relevant research manuscripts from that period, now contained in *Hua* XXXIV, 3–5, 110ff, 119–20, but also from later ones, ibid., 132ff, 148ff, 394ff.
One page later, attempting once again to define *transcendental* reduction, Husserl uses almost identical forms of expression.

The transcendental epoché, the radical putting-out-of-play [radikale Außerspielsetzung] of every activation whatsoever of the validity of the “[out]-there-being-world” [daseiende Welt] is accomplished through an act of will in such a way that it is “once and for all.” (*PTP*, 247/341); transl. md.)

In the second case, the process by which the “[out]-there-being-world” is left out of play is radical. In the first case it amounts to the interruption of every transcendent positing and the limitation of the psychic to its proper essence. In the second, we are not concerned with a simple interruption, but with the de-activation of the validity of an [out]-there-being-world, which leads us back to the roots of transcendental positing. This new ground deletion of the causes of the prejudice regarding a world that exists independently, ‘out there,’ brings about the definite abandonment of the specific (realistic) ontological interpretation of the appearing world.

From all the above until the present point, it becomes clear that transcendental reduction signals the *expansion* of Phenomenology’s purview and the *radicalization* of its analyses. With the transcendental reduction, Phenomenology is transformed from Pure Psychology to Universal Ontology. Instead of restricting itself to just the appearances of psychic acts and their objects, it expands its jurisdiction to the full actuality of the intentional correlates of all kinds and levels. Through the transcendental reduction, we also reach the depths of the structures of the time-fields of absolute consciousness that are responsible for the constitution of all the kinds of actual objectivities and objectivities.

Reduction of the natural world to the absolute of consciousness [i.e., transcendental reduction] yields *factual* concatenations of consciousness’ living experiences of every kind with distinctive ruled orders in which a *morphologically* [i.e., not necessarily, already exact-scientifically] *ordered* [actual] world in the sphere of empirical intuition becomes [even after and during this reduction] constituted [sich konstituiert] as their empirical [intentionally appearing] correlate. (*Ideas* I, 134/124)

The consciousness in which the world is constituted in this sense is the transcendentally pure consciousness. Husserl calls this consciousness “absolute” since, instead of being dependent on *some being*, it is itself the ground upon

---

47 As Husserl had wanted his Phenomenology to be (see the fourth part of *Ideas* I).

48 See also *EJ*, 49–50/48–9, where this doublcity of the transcendental reduction in particular is described on the basis of the discovery of the lifeworld: transcendental reduction leads, on the one hand, to the primordial, pre-predicatively given lifeworld and, on the other hand, to the constituting transcendental subjectivity. The same doublcity is described also in many other passages in the *Crisis*. Levinas nicely condenses the meaning of the transcendental reduction as follows: “[Transcendental] phenomenological reduction is a *purification of the concrete life [of intentional consciousness]* from *any naturalistic interpretation regarding its existence*, but also the awareness of the fact that the origination of Being is accomplished in the concrete life of [intentional] consciousness” (Levinas 1973, 93; transl. md.). Nowhere do we find something like an exclusive entrapment in a self-enclosed immanence that has lost its intentional relatedness to a world and its beings. For more on the latter, see §2.7 and Chap. 3.
which the totality of beings depends. The expansion and the radicalization that transcendental reduction offers to the jurisdiction of Phenomenology are also accompanied by a simultaneous new sense-giving projected upon both the contents of the concepts “reality” and “consciousness.” Transcendentally pure consciousness is not identical with the psychologically pure consciousness, which still presupposes the ontology of the natural attitude. Transcendental consciousness is the field of the transcendental, intentional, synthesizing functions, within which the very ontological validity (Geltung) of the at-each-time appearing objectivity, belonging to this or that ontological region (Region) or constitution-level (Konstitutionsstufe) is, for the first time, established.

Transcendental Phenomenology undertakes the task of experiencing and putting into words the intentional noetic-noematic correlations of all sorts, in which the various objective unities of this or that kind of transcendency and Being are constituted. From now on, the term “world” may mean the thingly transcendence (the sensorially experienceable world) as well as the world of numbers, of the geometrical figures, but also any other region of beings with which we can find ourselves in an intentional relatedness in corresponding intentional acts. The beings of every region acquire their Being-meaning within the at-each-time proper horizon of co-givenness (region, world) disclosed in the corresponding experiences. In this way, every transcendentally constituted region of beings entertains its own proper meaning of Being, which originates in transcendental subjectivity and appertains to the corresponding way of correlative givenness.

In Transcendental Phenomenology, the term “intentionality” now names the accomplishing correlations (leistende Korrelationen) in which beings of various types of Being are constituted and appear in corresponding intentional comportments. For example, intentionally living in a perceptual correlation means that we are already out in the world, that the actual beings of the known experiential world appear to us and are for us. The known things are given to us with their familiar ‘phenomenology’ (three-dimensionally, intuitable from this or that particular perspective, with colors, shapes, being close or afar, up or down, on our right or left, accessible if we move toward them, graspable, etc.). Analogous remarks hold for the beings that belong to other ontological regions and appear as such in the appropriate for them intentional acts. Moreover, no being can anymore be comprehended as standing beyond its truthful actuality. Truthfully appearing beings are, in each case, as real as it can get. Their very ‘substantiality,’ so to speak, is contained in their appearing and is constituted in transcendental consciousness.

49 On the problematic meaning of this, however, see also §2.7 below.

50 See also Chaps. 4 and 5.
Nevertheless, in order to describe the intentional correlations discovered by the transcendental reduction, Husserl also uses a seemingly paradoxical phraseology. Instead of saying that consciousness is correlatively out there in the world ‘meeting’ with the very beings, he prefers the transcendentally equivalent expression that the world is correlative ‘within’ consciousness. This phrasing creates, of course, considerable difficulties, which are, however, not irresolvable. Since the absolutizing positing of the natural attitude has been lifted or stricken-through, experience, knowledge, praxis, valuation and their corresponding intentionally existing objectivities are now understood from the point of view of transcendental correlations. The expression “transcendental intentional correlation” does not mean an accidental engagement between a self-accessible consciousness and a mutely posited inaccessible reality in itself, resulting in the intentional opening up of the world and its beings qua psychologically-phenomenologically meant transcendent phenomena. Rather, it names the happening of the constitution and givenness of actual objectivities of all kinds of Being, in corresponding synthesizing functions of the “absolute” field of transcendental consciousness. On this basis, all Being is ‘within’ transcendental consciousness as a self-overcoming, self-extending, self-transcending field of constitution, resulting in the truthful appearance of intentional correlates in their whatever actuality.\(^51\)

As has already been said, it is for this reason that Phenomenology achieves its upgrading from an Eidetic-Descriptive Psychology to a complete Universal Ontology. With the transcendental reduction, it reaches the field of possibilities that establish the intentional correlations and yield Being to the corresponding correlates of all kinds in their proper world-horizons. In this perspective, the world is no longer an existent in itself, which somehow makes its entrance in a camera-like self-enclosed consciousness, and nor is our access to it limited to just knowing the phenomenologically-psychologically meant—transcendent, to be sure—phenomena. Whatever the meaning and validity of the Being of these phenomena may be, it is also meaning and validity constituted in transcendental consciousness.

Husserl’s Phenomenology thus undertakes the infinite task of describing the multifarious, inter-layered noeses-noemata correlations, i.e., of the world in its broadest sense; and both statically and also, eventually, genetically. Thus, we will be able to render intelligible to ourselves the specific sense and validity of every ‘reality’ and of all truth and knowledge that is to be evidently accepted about it.

\(^51\)With these, however, not everything has been yet explained. We will come to this issue, i.e., to the idea that transcendental consciousness is an absolute all-inclusive sphere of intentional time-syntheses in §2.7 below.
2.6 Further Refinement of the Transcendental Reduction and Its Residue

2.6.1 Transcendental Reduction and Eidetic Reduction

2.6.1.1 A Preamble on Phenomenological Eidetics

After the examination of the problem of reduction and the elucidation of the fundamental traits of the psychological-phenomenological and the transcendental-phenomenological reductions, let’s now turn for a while to a different problem. Even in the *Idea*, we basically come across three reductions: the psychological, the eidetic, and the transcendental. The first two are the methods that Husserl had already silently employed in his *LI* (1900–1901), where the psychological was implicitly and the eidetic almost explicitly present. From this point of view, even if in the *Idea* the term “reduction” shows up, whatever genuine turn occurs in that work is not related with either the psychological or the eidetic reduction. Of course, in the *Idea*, Husserl comes to a better retrospective understanding of the methods he had already set to work in the *LI*.\(^{52}\) There, the new element is the transcendental reduction, but this is present only with imperfect clarity (as we will see later in the present subsection and in §2.7). This, however, means that the eidetic reduction, which leads us from the particulars to their species (\(\epsilon\iota\delta\nu\eta\)), is neither introduced there for the first time, and nor does its application amount, by itself, to either the psychological or the transcendental reduction.

The eidetic reduction brings us from the experience of particulars to the experience (intuition) of their universal essence. The process by which this happens is called “free imaginative variation” or simply “eidetic reduction.” In order to reach the intuition of an eidos or essence of a particular, we take an actual or imaginary particular specimen, we freely vary its aspects or characteristics or parts, and through this process we acquire, in parallel, the intuition of the species, the particular, or the essence that is valid for it. For example, and in order to take one of the simplest and least problematic cases, by varying the lengths of the sides of a triangle, as well as the magnitude of its angles, we come to grasp the eidos “triangle” in the sense of what is essential to any triangle. This is why we can also speak here about achieving an intuition of essences (*Wesensschau*). Of course, it is an open question whether there is something like the essence of everything, e.g., of consciousness, of perception, of space, of movement in space, of a whale or platypus, or of man and of other empirical particulars, like gold or the color red, etc., and whether our grasping of an essence is infallible, etc. It appears that there are various possibilities and restrictions with regard to all of these.\(^{53}\)

\(^{52}\)On this, see also De Boer (1978), 305ff.

\(^{53}\)See, for instance, a condensed account in Theodorou 2012b, note 18. Cf. Sowa’s—Fregean and Popperian or, more generally, empiricist-analytic, I would say—lemmata “Eidos” and “Eidetics and its methodology” (Sowa 2010a, 2011), where, e.g., the difference between the analysis of phe-
Before anything else, care must be taken with regard to the following. Although the Husserl of the *LI* sounded as if he considered the eidos as a Platonic Idea, he does not actually subscribe to such realism with regard to universals. Husserl is explicit that he does not hypostatize the species either metaphysically or psychologically (see second *LI*, §7). In addition, even though the terminological expression “free variation” as indicating the method for reaching the eidos or essence does not appear in the second *LI*, which is dedicated to the “Ideal Unity of the Species,” it actually appears repeatedly in the third *LI* (§§5, 23), which deals with the “Phenomenological Apriori.” In the third *LI*, Husserl shows the steps that lead us to the discovery of essential truths and safeguards the soundness of the talk about species. This means that the *LI* contain the first teaching concerning the method of eidetic reduction and eidetic seeing, based on the method of free variation. In his later writings, i.e., *Ideas* I, *FTL* and *EJ*, Husserl becomes aware of the complexity and limitations involved in that basic teaching. Finally, eidos should not be understood according to the following confused suggestions. The eidos is not some representative member of its extension. The species is not some of its actual or potential specimens. The species of the triangle is not another triangle and the species “red” is not some shade of red. Hume’s empiricism falsely maintained the contrary. (This, after all, may also have been Socrates’ enigmatic point, when he asked “what is bravery?” and his interlocutors replied in vain by mentioning examples of brave men. Of course, Phenomenology, and especially Transcendental Phenomenology, does not espouse Plato’s or Aristotle’s solutions *tout court.* The species “triangle” is not the fused sum of the actual and/or possible multifariously differentiated triangles, as Locke tried to show, simply because there cannot be any such thing. Nor is eidos the open collection of the diversified specimens that are

nomena and the analysis of concepts, as well as the difference between the (accepted) contingency of *inductive generalization* and the (at least claimed) necessity of *essential universalization*, is not taken into consideration; a fact that creates considerable disorientation (in particular, e.g., 2011, 258–9). For more on the just mentioned difference, which has tantalized philosophy (the status of philosophical research and the possibility of philosophical knowledge) since at least the time of Ockham, see Chap. 3, §3.3. The introduction here of the difference under discussion is my way of approaching the problem that Heffernan (2013, 2014) and Hopkins (2007, 2014) have with the situation regarding the meaning, place, and function of essence or eidos in the context of Husserlian Phenomenology, as presented by Husserl interpreters such as Zahavi (2003), Sowa (2010b), and Beyer (2013). See also Hopkins 2011, where parts of the history of philosophy like Plato’s and Aristotle’s theories of universals and Husserl’s eidetic Phenomenology are examined together in a rather elucidatory way. Moreover, even though the distinction between meaning species and intuitional species (see, e.g., the Introduction to the second *LI*) is generally ignored, despite its great importance for understanding the method and aim of Husserl’s Phenomenology, will only be hinted at here. The analysis that follows focuses basically on the *intuitional* eidos or species. Its relevance and importance, however, shows up later in §8.8.1.

54See also the beginning of §2.4 and §2.7.2. In his later writings, Husserl also distinguishes between various kinds of evidence in the givenness or intuition of essences, as well as various kinds and levels of essences. There is also some disagreement with regard to the actuality and weightiness of the difference between essence (*Wesen*) and eidos (*Eidos*) or species (*Spezies*). For our purposes, the terms will be taken as equivalent.
empirically discoverable or that come imaginatively to the fore in the process of free variation. The issue is what we presuppose, in order to be able to even start collecting such specimens.

Let us press on a little more with our latter example. The phenomenologist or, more originally, the phenomenologically working geometer who wants to know, in eidetic intuition, what a triangle is, freely varies in his or her imagination given actual or imaginative specimens of triangles and constantly asks himself or herself whether the ever new variant of the original accidental specimen is still recognizable as a triangle or not. The condition that enables us to decide the matter is the *intuitional* eidos “triangle.” And, in eidetic variation, we in fact become intuitionally aware of the thusly discoverable limits of the horizon within which this condition ‘moves’ and—in appropriate cases, like the triangle, also—‘gets crystalized,’ as it were. The elements comprising what is thusly crystalized within the aforementioned limits are also what I should normally *emptily conceive of* when I think the concept “triangle” or when I talk about triangles, etc. Eidetic variation indeed creates a potentially limitless series of actually incompatible variational specimens (themselves belonging to subordinate species “isosceles,” “orthogonal,” “scalene,” etc.) as candidates recognizable by the superordinate eidos. Putting aside the difficulty that this infinite series of varying specimens could only at the limit be held in unity within some ‘eidetic’ intuition, it should not in any case be considered that the disjunctive unity of the members of this series is equal to the eidos. Only the *condition thanks to which* this disjunction can in principle be held in a sound unity is to be considered as the intuitable eidos. What is crucial for our grasping the eidos is the pinpointing of the ‘aspect’ or the ‘affinity’ from the point of view of which the series of incompatibles is recognized as relevant and unifiable in this series. And in the eidetic variation, we become intuitionally and explorably aware (even if in many cases in a ‘negative’ way) of the eidos as a complex criterion for deciding the relevance and unifiability of such otherwise incompatible variants. Husserl teaches that while the eidetic variation and its ‘negative’ exploration progress, we become aware not so much of the particulars comprising the series of the variational specimens (which may be open-ended), but of the *a priori* or, better, *necessary condition* on the basis of which these explored and potential members of the series are held together. Generally speaking, the ‘elements’ making up this condition are equal to the eidos as peculiar, intuitionally surveyable, identical and ideal unity. The latter is then the *point of view* from which all the specimens, empirically available and imaginatively constructible, are indeed recognizable as specimens belonging together in what they are.

In the transcendental phenomenological constitutive perspective, of course, the species have become the necessary, *a priori* presupposed *rules* of intentional synthesis. What in the Phenomenology of eidetic constitution was a particular belonging to an eidos (meaning-aiming or intuitional-fulfilling) is now what is noetically aimed at as such, by the noetic sense, in the empty intentional acts of thinking, and intuitionally recognized as such (by the noematic sense) in the corresponding noematic fulfilment.
2.6.1.2 Eidetic Reduction Must Be Carefully Distinguished from the Transcendental Reduction

Having said this, we now come to our narrower issue. We should not think, as Taminiaux (1989) does, that Husserl, unable to reach the realistic world with its appearing particulars and faced with the danger of being left with only the Heracletian flow of the non-appearing real contents, abruptly introduces “the” (transcendental) phenomenological reduction and switches to Phenomenology as Eidetic Analysis in order to finally save the intentional appearance of at least universal objects (the species of the transcendently appearing, particular objects and the species of the intentional acts). For Taminiaux, after Husserl realized that the realistic transcendent world is unreachable, he presents to himself the task of explaining the fact that we have knowledge, that we cognize, i.e., that we intentionally experience objectivities that transcend the immanence of our consciousness with its mere real contents (representations, impressions, sensations). And he supposedly does this by means of the methodology he now introduces, i.e., by “the” (transcendental) phenomenological reduction. Taminiaux thus suggests that this ‘emancipation’ of our consciousness, from its immanently carried real contents, happens only at the level of its reaching the ideal species. In this way, he seems to suppose, the transcendental turn enables Husserl to finally entrench his new interpretation of intentionality and offer an account of how consciousness manages to overcome its virtually chaotic real immanence and direct itself toward transcendently (with respect to the flow of real contents) appearing, intentional objectivities, i.e., for him, the universal species.

Something like this, however, would not constitute a solution (nor even a renewed stance) to the double problem of transcendence, i.e., to the problem of bridging “the inner with the outer” and “the psychic with the realistic.” For, indeed, Husserl thinks that with ‘the’ reduction—the transcendental reduction—he gives an answer to the problem of how, e.g., perception manages to find its object and not a mere Schein of it, for instance this actual tree over there.

In the perception of an external thing, just that thing, let us say a house standing before our eyes, is said to be perceived. The house is a transcendent thing, and forfeits its existence [verhält der Existenz] after the [transcendental] phenomenological reduction. The house-appearance, this cogitatio, emerging and disappearing in the stream of consciousness, is given as actually evident [wirklich evident]. [. . . ] [I]s it not [. . . ] evident that a[n] [actual] house appears in the house-phenomenon, and that it is just on this count that we call it a perception of a house? And what appears is not only a house in general [a species], but just exactly this [actual particular] house, determined in such and such a way and appearing in that determination. (Idea, 57/72)\textsuperscript{56}


\textsuperscript{56}Similar remarks are found, e.g., in CM, 32–3/71. Caution is needed, of course, due to the fact that in the Idea, Husserl does not fully and clearly control the method of transcendental reduction. What he seeks to achieve, however, is sometimes there too.
This means that perception is neither imagination, nor dream, nor hallucination, nor illusion, nor experience of species. Phenomenology, i.e., Transcendental Phenomenology too, changes nothing as regards this. Transcendental reduction of perception lets us, of course, again perceive, albeit in a new ontological interpretation of its correlates and in a new interpretation of the constituting functions of perceptual consciousness. It lets perception surface as a direct intentionality, responsible for the special appearance of actual intentional objects that are not self-subsistent, but constituted in this particular intentional possibility of transcendental consciousness. Transcendental reduction of perception presents us with perception in its most ultimate primordiality, before the realistic interpretation has been imposed upon its correlates by the general positing regulating the natural attitude. But this does not mean that the transcendentally reduced beings are not ‘real’ (actual) or even that they are less ‘real’ (actual).

[For Transcendental Phenomenology,] the things are [...] constituted in these [intentional] acts, and come to be given in such acts. It is only as so constituted that they display themselves as what they are [als das, was sie sind] [—not merely “appear to be”]. (Idea, 57/72)

That is, after the effectuation of the transcendental reduction, we realize that in transcendental consciousness, the very actual things and objectivities are constituted, “as that which they are,” neither as mere phenomena nor as already universal species.

At least with reference to the direct ‘out-going’ acts, transcendental reduction does not amount to—either immanent or transcending—transcendence toward the species. On the other hand, the expansion of the legitimate scope of Phenomenology, through the activation of the transcendental reduction so as to also include Being, does not lead to the recognition only of the existence of the ideally being species. The discovery of the species is not the exclusive task either of the Idea or of any other psychological-phenomenological or transcendental-phenomenological work. On the contrary, in both Psychological Phenomenology and Transcendental Phenomenology, eidetic reduction comes as the separate, second step in the methodology of the phenomenological work of elucidating the phenomena. Once Phenomenology has, with the application of the epoché and the reduction, discovered its field of research, it then moves toward the unveiling of the necessary structures involved in the accomplishments of intentional correlations. This research is done only with the employment of the eidetic reduction. As we will see in the

57To be sure, as De Boer has so profoundly observed, Husserl’s presentation of the transcendental reduction in the Idea still retains a “psychological flavour,” (1978, 305 n. 1, 309). The same can be maintained, though, even with reference to Husserl’s “Philosophy as a Rigorous Science” (1911); it is not totally clear there whether Husserl presents us with the science of Eidetic Phenomenological Psychology or with the philosophy of Transcendental Phenomenology. The meaning of this remark, though, will be decisively clarified later, in §2.7. As I have already said, I think that the situation becomes progressively clear to Husserl only during the late 1920s, especially on the occasion of the challenge that the “Britannica Article” (1927) in so many ways represented for him. But even in his “Amsterdam Lectures” (1928) the issue somehow always remains in suspension.
next chapter (§3.3), Phenomenology is not research aiming at inductive, accidental generalizations over particulars. It is always in search of the set of the necessary transcendental a priori structures making possible the multilayered intentional correlations, i.e., eidetically put, it is a search for the corresponding eides or essences. For example, once a perceptual intentional correlation is psychologically or transcendentally secured and stabilized, the phenomenologist may then proceed by subjecting the poles of this correlation to an *eidetic variation* and examine essential dependencies, e.g., those concerning the perceptual act and its inner folds, or the appearing thing and its adumbrations, or the color and the surfaces, etc. As we already saw, the intuitional—not discursive—proof and experience of these discoverable necessary dependencies form, then, in each case, the totality of a unitary species (here: “perception”). This work may then be suitably extended to the many levels of givenness and to the many directions and ramifications of founding dependencies, e.g., between perception and imagination, or perception and judgment, etc.

### 2.6.2 Transcendental Reduction Does Not Present Us with Non-actual Particulars in Reflection

Let us now examine another point. Drummond (1990) generally follows the so-called “transcendental” or “East-Coast” interpretation of Husserl’s phenomenological philosophy, with which I have much in common. Contrary to the so-called “Fregean” or “West-Coast” interpretation of Husserl’s Phenomenology, he rightly maintains that noemata are not abstract beings that supposedly mediate between consciousness and realistic things. Following Sokolowski, however, he does not make the distinction employed here between psychological- and transcendental-phenomenological reductions. Thus, he suggests that in the phenomenological “or” transcendental reduction, the general positing of the natural attitude is lifted, in the sense that we no longer adopt a definite position with regard to the real existence or not of the outer thing, whereas we simultaneously turn reflectively to the very acts. Moreover, he concludes that if one were to exclude the very reflective act, transcendental reduction amounts to what Husserl in the *Ideas* I called “neutralizing modification” (*neutralisierende Modification*).

In many respects, this reading comes close to the one presented in the foregoing sections. However, neutralizing modification is a process different from both the psychological- and the transcendental-phenomenological reductions. In Phenomenology, the neutralizing modification basically gains its sense only after the transcendental reduction, which has lifted the general positing and has opened up, for us, the things and all sorts of objectivities as actual—appropriately understood in every case—noemata, constituted in transcendental consciousness. As an additional

---

move, with the effectuation of the neutralizing modification upon such correlative noemata, we are left with such noemata destitute of their pertaining doxic theses (actuality, doubt, supposition, etc.), much like the way in which the purely imaginary objects are given to us in the first place.

At first sight, neutralizing modification may also look similar to the psychological reduction. It is not identical to that either, however. We saw that after the psychological reduction, we are left with the thing just appearing (as transcendent mere phenomenon) in the psychological sphere of experience. In this, the thing appears only as a phenomenon, but also as a phenomenon of its supposed realistic status (of its own or of its background underpinning it, as it were). The realistic dimension keeps underlying there, behind or underneath, so to speak, the psychologically, simply appearing thing. In the attitude of the psychological phenomenological reduction, we simply do not engage in any definite position-taking with reference to it. Neutralizing modification, on the other hand, applies, e.g., to a correlative actual noema and definitely subtracts, as it were, from it all its actuality (or other possible doxicalities). It does not apply to a thing that, from the standpoint of the natural attitude, is seen as something realistic (or as underpinned by something realistic) in order to abstract from it that specific ontological status.

That is, it is not neutralizing modification that sets us free from the prejudice of the natural attitude after all.

---

59Thus, see Drummond’s sincere and honest aporia, when he refers to the comment “No!” that Husserl wrote in the margin of one of his personal copies of the Ideas I, next to the point where the original text was connecting neutralizing reduction with the reduction “[about] which we have earlier spoken so much,” i.e., basically with the transcendental reduction in that work (see Drummond 1990, 53, 58 n. 10).

60For Drummond, the natural attitude is the attitude in which we have the experience of actualities directly presented in our intentional acts (1990, §§9-10 and, especially, 50, 84, 115, 118). Phenomenological reduction (thus unspecifically) supposedly transfers the phenomenologist from the natural attitude to the philosophical-phenomenological attitude. This becomes possible because the reduction releases the phenomenologist from accepting the actuality of the appearing objectivities and gives him or her the possibility and the right to turn the gaze, directing it now upon the very act in which the thing appears (instead of living in the direct intentionality that is turned upon the appearing thing). This combination of reduction and reflection is seen as a methodological move that gives us the thing not as actual—as Drummond thinks they are given in the natural attitude—but as some abstract, non-actual constituent of intentional consciousness. See Drummond 1990, 52, 58 n. 9. The same holds for Sokolowski (1984, 1987, 2000, especially 47ff., 57ff.). Husserl, however, even in 1933, was trying to free Transcendental Phenomenology from the misinterpretation that the transcendental reduction was some “abstraction” from the concrete world-life [Weltleben] (“Hua XXXIV, xlv).

61At a certain point, Drummond himself remarks that “The neutrality-modification, in fact, does not necessarily involve a departure from the natural attitude” (1990, 52). For him, however, this happens only because the neutrality modification, understood now just as a first step of doubt, does not on its own amount to “the [full] performance of the phenomenological reduction, [but] it is merely the precondition for any kind of reflection” (ibid.). For Drummond and Sokolowski “the” reduction must be completed with the philosophical reflection that has the specific character of being phenomenological; a character that consists in turning our concern from the object to its
2.6.3 Transcendental Reduction Does Not Leave Us with Senses or Meanings

It has also been suggested that transcendental reduction leaves us with residues that are nothing but senses or meanings of intentional objectivities. For example, Gutting (1971) explicitly and clearly reports that “the” (one and unspecified) phenomenological reduction does not annihilate the world but that something is saved after it, while the transcendental consciousness at which we arrive is not the Cartesian ego, a small part in the overall reality, but “when we have the absolute consciousness we have everything” (1971, 211; also 207–216). However, if we do not make any distinction between the psychological- and the transcendental-phenomenological reduction, certain consequences follow, even if we say something very reasonable and straight like the latter (we will come back to this in §2.7). Gutting supposes that in the (transcendental) reduction “[w]e do not . . . find objects as real . . . components of consciousness . . . but . . . as non-real, intentional components of consciousness—i.e., as meanings” (ibid., 214; emphasis added).

The same holds, among others, for Crowell (1990). Despite the fact that he rightly draws the distinction between psychological and transcendental reduction, he characterizes only the first of these as phenomenological, which he equates with a reflective turn upon the being-lived of the lived-through in the context of the natural attitude. He then equates transcendental reduction with an abstraction of the Being—qua being-there or being-before-hand (Vorhandenheit)—from mundane beings. He also suggests that after the transcendental reduction, we seem to be left with mundane beings, i.e., for him, with the transcendental ego and the beings with which it is intentionally—to be sure—related; beings, however, from which any sense of existence is abstracted away. For Crowell, then, and especially with reference to the ‘object’ side of that intentional relation, this means that we are left with only meanings of beings. For him, that is, Husserl’s analyses, made possible
after the transcendental reduction, are actually “analyses of meanings,” analyses with only epistemological and no ontological significance.\textsuperscript{66}

From the point of view defended in this chapter, though, the transcendentally reduced beings, i.e., the noemata (as residua of the transcendental reduction), have not lost anything of their fundamental actuality. The sole change is that from now on we phenomenologically realize that the characteristic “independent self-existence” no longer belongs to the meaning of their Being (to what it means that they \textit{are}). These very \textit{actual things} appear to us as intuitional phenomena and are apprehended by us as constituted in intentional correlations. Only in this way can Husserl maintain that in the transcendental reduction, while in a sense we ‘eliminate’ the world, in the end \textit{we do not lose anything at all} (this is after all the striking peculiarity of the transcendental reduction).\textsuperscript{67} The strangeness (\textit{Fremdartigkeit}) of transcendental reduction, to which Husserl refers,\textsuperscript{68} consists exactly in this provocative claim; and the world does not disappear only in case we do not see its residue either as an abstractum in reflection or as a meaning.

Phenomenological research will, of course, proceed further by means of the eidetic reduction, whose purpose is to elucidate those necessary structures of consciousness that made the corresponding intentional correlation possible in the first place.

\subsection*{2.6.4 Phenomenological Reduction and Methodological Solipsism}

We can now refer briefly also to another interesting connection, which, if properly understood, may be of great help in building bridges for a mutual understanding between the analytic and the phenomenological philosophical traditions. Husserl’s ‘phenomenological’ reduction has also been understood in terms of Carnap’s

\textsuperscript{66}See ibid., 507–8, 515. See also Mohanty 1985, ch. 13 and, especially, pp. 192, 202. The view that Phenomenology is the “analysis of meanings” is quite widespread among Husserlians, especially among those who show particular interest in establishing communicative channels with analytic philosophers. A stance like the latter is praiseworthy; and would have been fruitful if it enjoyed mutual trust and esteem. Be that as it may, Husserl himself opposed his interpreters who saw his Phenomenology as a mere analysis of meanings (see, e.g., “Draft” §10). Phenomenology is \textit{intuitional} research into the essential structures of \textit{phenomena} (in correlation to the empty meanings or—in case of pre-linguistic intentionality—senses by which they were or are being aimed at); it is not any usual discursive analysis of meanings. And what is most curious, for Phenomenology, even the empty aiming meanings (and senses) are seen as phenomena to be analysed or rather—as it generally pertains to phenomena—\textit{elucidated} in evidence.

\textsuperscript{67}See Ideas I, §88.

\textsuperscript{68}See PTP, 252/295.
methodological solipsism, i.e., the methodological stance from which one is supposed to be able to construct the world on the basis of one’s own auto-psychological states (the immediate data of experience).  

Barry Smith and David W. Smith, however, make this association without any further qualification (see the Introduction to their 1995). Fodor brought back to the foreground the research-strategy that Carnap called “methodological solipsism” (Fodor 1980, 63–73), which the latter himself too explicitly associated with Husserl’s method of “phenomenological reduction” (not further specified). According to the generally current view regarding ‘the’ phenomenological reduction, Smith and Smith see only one reduction, which they identify with the epoché, that is, with the methodological move by which “[w]e [ . . . ] ‘bracket,’ or abstain from positing the existence of the natural world around us” (1995, 11), without any further specification. Again, following the generally accepted view, they think that after this move we are introduced to a philosophy that has found shelter in a “‘pure’ consciousness,” identified with the phenomenological “transcendental ego” (ibid., 10–11). Paradoxically, they also think that, even after this move, a phenomenological ontology remains. The paradox grows bigger when one discovers that, in their interpretation, this phenomenological ontology is generally sought for in the pre-transcendental Phenomenology of the Prolegomena (1900) and of the phenomenological mereology of the third LI (1901), without any mention of the Ideas I (1913) and the subsequent transcendental works of Husserl, where the latter effectuated the ontological maturation of the transcendentially naïve appeals to beings (particular and universal) that one encounters in the LI. What they generally conclude is that, in the end, ontology in Husserl’s Phenomenology (without any other specification) is nothing but Formal Ontology, which studies only objects in general, properties in general, relations and relata in general, etc. (ibid., 27f.). Nevertheless, only under specific conditions, which have to do with the interpretation of Husserl’s conception of intentionality, can this move be associated with the “methodological solipsism” that Carnap introduced. More specifically, I would dare say that Carnap’s methodological solipsism, together with his principle of tolerance, could at best be compared to Husserl’s psychological-phenomenological reduction.  

But, again, we must always bear two things in mind. Firstly, it is not at

---


71See especially his very important Carnap 1950. Surprisingly, let me add here, Quine’s more radical pragmatist response to Carnap could, I think, be read as parallel to what was here reconstructed as the ontological point of view, enabled by Husserl’s transcendental phenomenological reduction. Under certain conditions that have to do with questions of primordiality with reference to language learning over pre-linguistic perception (and vice versa), Quine’s view (1951) can be read in this way. We read there that from a strictly epistemological point of view, i.e., based on what is given to the mere senses, we can say that, e.g., the ontological claims of nuclear Physics are not superior to these of ancient Greek mythology, etc. That is, to put it simply, from within the corresponding experiential frameworks, protons in the nuclear laboratory are understood as no more real than goddess Athena in her interventions during the Trojan battles. To put it more phenomenologically,
all clear how or whether Carnap disengages from the traditional representationalist epistemology that lies far behind Husserl’s intentional-phenomenological solution to the problem of transcendence. Secondly, Carnap attempted a logical-judgmental construction of the world, whereas Husserl started from an elucidation of the happening of the primordial, pre-linguistic, passive constitution of the appearing world and its beings. Linguistic cognition demanded a second and higher founded level of analysis that would explain the function of thematization and the formation of the corresponding higher-level correlative experience.

Lastly, let me make a remark in connection with the view of Smith and Smith regarding the possibility and character of the ontology that we are left with after the transcendental reduction. We have to be careful to distinguish when, in Phenomenology, the expressions “something” (etwas) and “in general” (überhaupt) are used with a formal-general meaning and with a material-general (or regional) meaning and, for that matter, when they are used in connection, correspondingly, with a priori analytic or a priori synthetic truths. Otherwise, we are left with a distorted and, in the end, erroneous picture of Phenomenology. Formal Ontology offers us only analytic truths, whereas Husserl is quite confident and persistent in stating that Transcendental Phenomenology is a goldmine of a priori synthetic discoveries regarding our intentional correlations with actual beings in their ontological regions.

2.7 Transcendental Reduction: Elucidating the Remaining Adytum

2.7.1 Phenomenological Psychology and Transcendental Phenomenology: Sciences or Philosophies?

First of all, let us turn our attention to a closely related puzzle left for us by Husserl. In his lecture course of the SS of 1912, Husserl had presented his idea about a science with the name “Rational Psychology,” which could and should found—the already developed at that time—Empirical Psychology. In a sense, this founding Psychological science ought to be Phenomenology. But Phenomenology had been conceived as science even before 1912. More concretely, it can be argued that even in his “Philosophy as a Rigorous Science” (1910–1911), Husserl speaks precisely about such a Rational or Phenomenological Psychology qua science, and not what I experience as real (read: actual) depends in each case on the level of intentional functionings (primordial or founded) and on the internal consistency of the intentional constitutions, based on the ways consciousness interprets its relevant reell contents. See also the references in the next note.

72 Regarding Husserl’s interesting influence on Carnap’s philosophical thinking, see also the important Haddock 2008, especially 50ff.

73 On this, more will be said in Chaps. 5, 6, and 7. See also Theodorou 2010b.
about a Phenomenology qua *philosophy*, i.e., about Transcendental Phenomenology. Moreover, from the point of view of his lecture course “Phenomenological Psychology” (1925), Husserl himself explicitly recognizes, retrospectively, the *Logical Investigations* (1900–1901) as Descriptive Psychology or (better) as Intentional or Eidetic Psychology, i.e., again, as a science.\[^{74}\] To my knowledge, this tension with regard to whether Phenomenology, in one or the other of its versions, i.e., as Phenomenological Psychology or as Transcendental Phenomenology, is science or philosophy (founding or not) is not clearly solved in Husserl’s work. Even at the end of the 1920s, in the fourth and final version of the “*Britannica Article*” (1927), we read the following.

The term “Phenomenology” designates two things: a new kind of descriptive method which made a breakthrough in *philosophy* at the turn of the century, and an a priori *science* derived from it; a science which is intended to supply the basic instrument (Organon) for a rigorously scientific philosophy and in its consequent application, to make possible a methodical reform of all the sciences. Together with this philosophical Phenomenology, but not yet separated from it, however, there also came into being a new psychological discipline parallel to it in method and content: the a priori Pure or “Phenomenological” Psychology, which raises the reformational claim to being the basic methodological foundation on which alone a scientifically rigorous empirical Psychology can be established. An outline of this Psychological Phenomenology, standing nearer to our natural thinking, is well suited to serve as a preliminary step that will lead up to an understanding of philosophical Phenomenology. (PTP, 159/277–8; emphases added)

At times, Husserl also calls Phenomenological Psychology “First Philosophy.”\[^{75}\] The same oscillation is observable even later, e.g., in §52 of the *Crisis* (1936). In sum, I suggest that we should rather conclude that Transcendental Phenomenology is philosophy, and that Phenomenological Psychology is science. Of course, serious problems may still remain in suspension. For example, consider the following (consult the last cited passage).

(i) How will Phenomenology (as science) function as organon for the announced scientific philosophy?

(ii) What is the identity of this “scientific philosophy”?

(iii) What kind of science, after all, is the so-called “Pure Psychology”?

(iv) What kind of relation does it have with Phenomenology as philosophy?

(v) What kind of reformation will the latter bring about to the rest of the sciences?

(vi) If Phenomenological or Pure Psychology, as science, leads to a scientific philosophy that will reform the sciences, then how can this scientific philosophy also reform its presupposition (Phenomenology as science)?

\[^{74}\]To be sure, Husserl had already recognized that work as (Eidetic) Descriptive Psychology, i.e., as science, from the time of its first publication. See 5th *LI* of the 2nd ed., §16 first note. See also, however, the “Draft” (1913), §11.

\[^{75}\]See *Hua IX*, 267.
Transcendental Reduction: Elucidating the Remaining Adytum

This problematic situation is unavoidably reflected also in the meager but important bibliography on the issue. I hope that the foregoing sections can at least set the basis for a clearer background against which it will be tenable to overcome these difficulties.

As a beginning, it would suffice to say that a priori or Pure Phenomenological Psychology is conducted under the methodological constraints posed by the psychological-phenomenological reduction, and it contains necessary eidetic analyses of the intentional acts (aiming or fulfilling) and of their founding interdependencies. As such, it can comprise the pure or a priori epistemological part of Psychology as an empirical discipline, providing the latter with its appertaining object domain of research. The latter science can only have its objects available for empirical-experimental research when it has a clear pre-empirical, i.e., a priori or pure, recognition of these very objects in their essential constitution. Empirical research on the objects of an empirical science may proceed through “trial and error,” but sheer empirical trial and error is not the way by which this science came to have these objects available for research. This is the old Aristotelian and Kantian view of philosophy of science. To stay here only with Kant, the view says that the possibility of Physics as empirical science is founded upon a Pure Physics, an a priori discipline that contains the pure or metaphysical (a priori synthetic) principles of Physics. Generally speaking, these principles are general metaphysical and special metaphysical ones. In the case of Physics, principles of the first kind include causality, preservation of matter and energy, etc., whereas the three well-known Newtonian principles (action and reaction, inertia, and inertial mass as the fraction of force over the rate of velocity change) comprise the special metaphysics of Physics as empirical science. Interestingly, the spirit of this fundamental approach is also the core of the corresponding ideas that Kuhn’s and Feyerabend’s philosophies of science unknowingly re-introduced into discussion at the beginnings of the second half of the twentieth century.

---

76 I have in mind, for instance, Crowell 1990, and 2002a.

77 From this point of view only, this a priori laying-of-the-ground for the building of the specifically empirical research of a science may also be considered as the philosophical or metaphysical part of this science. In this part, the a priori philosophical work constitutes the object domain even of an empirical science, i.e., it forms the metaphysics of the object that the empirical research will investigate further. Otherwise, empirical research would be blind, stumbling accidentally, as it were, one time on this and another on that being, without having any clue about how to avoid, e.g., mixing cases that resemble each other only superficially (not essentially). Additional information is given in Chap. 3, n. 18, of the present book. In my Ph.D. thesis, after the development of an interpretation of the ground tenets in Husserl’s Phenomenology, I defended the view that the above philosophical preparation of the object domain of Physics as an empirical science is being accomplished in what is known as scientific “thought experiments” (see Theodorou 2000). Some points concerning this fundamental idea, presented in connection with the possibility and meaning of science’s historicization, can be found in Theodorou 2010b.

78 An important remark must be made at this point. Until now, we have been seeing Phenomenological Psychology as a Pure or Philosophical Psychology, functioning as a founding mathesis for any empirical psychological research. We have also been saying that Phenomenological Psychology
Beyond this function of Phenomenology as a priori establishment of the research field of any empirical Psychology, it could of course also play the role of first philosophy or ‘Fundamental Ontology.’ It would elucidate the process of constitution and the corresponding meaning of Being of the beings belonging to every ontological region. This would be the task of Transcendental Phenomenology in particular. Nevertheless, this method and the attitude it effectuates are anything but easily accessible and plain. Thus, taking into consideration the fact that Transcendental Phenomenology was conceived as a widening and deepening of Phenomenological Psychology, Husserl coined the idea that Phenomenological Psychology, being closer to our natural attitude intuitions, may work as an easy propaedeutic mathesis for the far more difficult entrance to the transcendental phenomenological stance and view. During the last years of the 1920s and in the 1930s, Husserl was confident that this study-schedule would work and do the whole job. For example, this stance can be easily traced in the “Britannica Article” body of manuscripts, as well as in the third part of the Crisis manuscripts, published in the Husserliana series.

2.7.2 One Step Forward Two Steps Back: Mundane andMonadological Transcendental Phenomenology

The above, however, were not the only difficulties that tortured Husserl throughout his life-long endeavor to consolidate Phenomenology into a fully intelligible and rigorous method of a priori research. As already mentioned above, in the early 1920s Husserl realized that Phenomenological Psychology actually develops from the point of view of some remaining power of the natural attitude.\(^79\) Psychological-phenomenological reduction had not actually eliminated the power of the natural attitude. It had certainly put the outer-psychic, physical realistic out of play, but had forgotten to do the same with some other presuppositions or prejudices of that attitude.

---

\(^79\)See also, e.g., Hua IX, 240-4.
Firstly, Husserl came to see that the psychologically-phenomenologically reduced Eidetic Psychological Phenomenology of the—thusly now read—*Logical Investigations* had no right to have posited a sphere of *eidetic realities* beyond the phenomenologically accessible intentional acts and intentionally appearing objectivities. Eidetic seeing, already discovered in the *LI*, secured that, in the intentional constitution and experience of particular objectivities appearing to the intentional acts, a *universal* factor interferes and determines what is significatively aimed at or experienced. Phenomenological eidetic seeing could ascertain that this universal is experienceable and phenomenologically intuitable in categorial acts of ideation; it wasn’t a mere conceptual fiction, a mere empty speculation. In that work, however, although Husserl did not actually substantiate the universal, either psychologically or metaphysically (the universal as such wasn’t either a part of the particular acts or a denizen of a Platonically heavenly or supra-heavenly reality), there was a problematic conception of it that somehow allowed it to be independently ‘outside’ or ‘beyond’ the act itself and its particular intentional objects. The species that become instantiated in the particular acts were *universa supra rem*, not themselves constituted in the intentional acts and yet necessarily presupposed for the latter. This is what standardly made the readers of the *LI* think that Husserl was there a Platonic realist with regard to species.

In his maturing after the publication of the *LI*, though, Husserl thought that the scheme of intentional constitution used in that work and its presupposition of that peculiar eidetic realm were only quasi-phenomenologically sustainable. The universal rule (*Materie*) conditioning—with its ‘instantiation’ in the aiming and fulfilling acts—the intentional constitution of transcendent objectivities could not itself be simply presupposed as an unconstituted, independent, quasi-reality. Thus, with the early transcendental turn of 1907, Husserl abandoned the “eidos (*Materie*)/instantiation scheme” of intentional constitution, which was in use in the eidetic psychological *LI* (1901). The constituting rule that is activated in the constituting acts is no longer seen as the universal *Materie* instantiated in them. Husserl now basically discovers and uncovers the rule-following *inner functionality* of constituting intentional acts.

The first transcendental reduction (1905–1907 until circa early 1920s), then, was a supplement to the psychological reduction that was already ‘unconsciously’ active in the eidetic *LI* (and only later thematized as such). And the methodological task of that transcendental reduction was to phenomenologically uncover what was genuinely taking place in the constituting acts of our intentional consciousness and, of course, what sense of Being this constitution was capable of assigning to the constituted objectivities. Presumably under the influence of the transcendentalist Natorp, Husserl testifies that consciousness is a time-field of constituting *functionings*. The factor dictating the functioning process was not *Materie* qua eidetic reality instantiated in these acts, but the *rule* guiding the *synthesizing* character of consciousness’ intentional functionings. This rule was generally called

---

80See §2.6.1 above.
sense (Sinn)—or meaning (Bedeutung) in the specific case of linguistic acts—and, since there are two kinds of acts, acts that merely aim and acts that intentionally fulfill these aimings, there are two senses: aiming senses and fulfilling senses. Husserl called the first “noetic senses” (noetische Sinnen) and the latter “noematic senses” (noematische Sinnen). The first prescriptively determine the objectivity that is emptily aimed at. The second—which, let me add here, is in all likelihood better understandable along the lines of the Kantian “schema”—sketch the lay out of the objectivity that intentionally appears.

In addition to this, as previously discussed, Husserl had made the bold move of transforming Phenomenology from epistemology to ontology. In brief, again, instead of being content with the phenomenological certification that intentional objectivities appear just as transcendentally self-manifesting correlates (with respect to the immanence of the stream of the reell contents of consciousness), he now claims that there are no realistic counterparts or underpinnings of such phenomena. Intentional objectivities are not ‘mere phenomena’ with respect to some other really real dimension behind or within the latter. Intentional objectivities are of course constituted basically as senses; they are somehow senses. Nevertheless, as such, they are as real as it gets in each case; e.g., in perception, the perceptual objects are as real as we experience them to be. There are no realistic beings, but the appearing phenomena are indeed fully actual and are characterized by the normal ‘phenomenology’ that we know in each case.

Secondly, Phenomenological Psychology is a mathesis working under the simply deactivated ontological prejudice of the natural attitude. As such, it itself suffers not only from the limitation we have seen, but also from an additional one applied this time to its own self. Intentional consciousness qua totality of psychologically psychic acts is itself a mere phenomenon that hovers over some unthematized but supposed realistic substratum. In Phenomenological Psychology, the connection that Husserl calls “psycho-physical” simply remains in suspension. The psychological psyche or the psychic intentional consciousness can, with its acts, be examined as a mere phenomenon. Transcendental Phenomenology will then be the philosophy that undertakes the task of resolving the latter’s abeyance too and every other problem concerning the meaning of Being for everything, i.e., also for consciousness as subject matter of Phenomenological Psychology. The view from which such a thing can be attempted is the one established by the transcendental reduction, as described in the foregoing sections. Of course, the one who attempts to perform it should be the above thematized, subject-side residuum of the latter reduction: the subject as transcendental consciousness. How this is expected to be done and whether this can be done at all will be seen in the remaining subsections.

These two basic points form at least a great part of the ground upon which Husserl’s first transcendental turn takes place. This move informs texts like the Idea, “Philosophy as a Rigorous Science,” and even Ideas I. During the 1920s, though, Husserl progressively came to realize that this first transcendental turn had forgotten to make an issue of the locus and status of the intentionally synthesizing transcendental consciousness itself. After the analysis of the meaning
of transcendental reduction in §§2.2, 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5 of the present chapter, we will now see that this story is further analyzable in at least two internal and generally opaque sub-stories.

With the first transcendental reduction, Husserl progressed by making the presuppositions of intentional constitution phenomenologically more appropriate. He had now made Phenomenology more sophisticated and mature to the degree that everything seemed to fall in the right place; everything appeared to be intact. Still, something else was wrong in that version of Transcendental Phenomenology.

In the “Britannica Article” manuscripts and, more particularly, in the second half of the second version of this work, but more clearly in the fourth version, which were both written by Husserl himself (mostly as a reply to Heidegger’s remarks and questions in the margins of the first version of the “Article”), the problem is articulated as follows. When we abandon the natural attitude, says Husserl, we realize that the world is and is what it is for our consciousness. Its Being and sense are Being and sense constituted in the intentional acts of our transcendental consciousness. This, however, soon leads to a serious problem.

Once the world in this full all-embracing universality has been related back to the subjectivity of consciousness, in whose living consciousness it makes its [transcendent] appearance precisely as “the world” in the sense it has now, then its whole mode of being acquires a dimension of unintelligibility [Unverständlichkeit]. [...] How it [consciousness], so to say, manages in its immanence that something which manifests itself can present itself as something [taken to be] existing in itself, and not only as something [merely] meant but as something authenticated in concordant experience [as true and actual]. [...] <Unverständlichkeit> is felt as a particularly telling affront to our very mode of being <as human beings>. For, obviously, we are the ones (individually and in community) in whose conscious life-process the [transcendentally] real [reale] world, which is present for us as such, gains sense and acceptance. As human creatures, however, we ourselves are supposed to belong to the world. When we start with the sense of the world <weltlichen Sinn> given with our mundane existing, we are thus again referred back to ourselves and our conscious life-process as that wherein for us this sense is first formed. (PTP, 168–9/288–9; emphases added)

And if this is a somehow careful attempt on Husserl’s part at a consolidation and clearing of the problem, here is how he described the situation regarding unintelligibility (Unverständlichkeit) in the second draft of the “Article” that Heidegger had read and questioned in puzzlement. On the one hand, since Phenomenology realizes that whatever is (in any sense of the word “is”) and is what it is only for a consciousness that constituted it in rule-governed synthesizing acts, the transcendental stance makes unintelligible (unverständlich) any posited reality in itself, e.g., the physically realistic, the world of numbers and of propositions in themselves, the sphere of eidetic realities in general, etc. (PTP 125/271). On the other hand, since Pure or Phenomenological Psychology still moves on the ground of positivity, it remains transcendentally naïve. This then produces a severe difficulty.

Despite their purity, all pure psychic [transcendently appearing] phenomena have the ontological sense of worldly real facts, even when they are treated eidetically as possible
facts of a world which is posited as general possibility but which, for that very reason, is also **unintelligible** from a transcendental point of view. For the psychologist, who as psychologist remains in positivitiy, the systematic psychological-phenomenological reduction, with its epoché regarding the existing world, is merely a means for [subsequently] reducing the human and animal psyche to its own pure and proper essence, all of this against the background of the world that, as far as the psychologist is concerned, remains continually in being and constantly valid. (*PTP*, 127–8/272–3; emphasis added).

It was these latter descriptions of his old teacher’s new insights that alerted Heidegger and forced him to thematize, in the relevant epistle we have, his absolutely understandable confusion and irritation with this dark issue of the "**unintelligibility**":

The first thing in the presentation of the transcendental problem is to clarify what the "unintelligibility" of entities means.

(i) In what respect are entities unintelligible? i.e., what higher claim of intelligibility is possible and necessary?
(ii) By a return to what is this intelligibility achieved?
(iii) What is the meaning of the absolute ego as distinct from the pure psychic?
(iv) What is the mode of being of this absolute ego—in what sense is it the same as the ever factual "I"; in what sense is it not the same?
(v) What is the character of the positing in which the absolute ego is something posited?
   To what extent is there no positivity (positedness) here?
(vi) The all-inclusiveness of the transcendental problem. (*PTP* 139/602)

Here is how we should make sense of the problem that the mature Husserl discovered within the perspective of his first Transcendental Phenomenology. Having in mind the two points presented earlier in this subsection, i.e., that every worldly being, in its whatever actuality, is constituted in intentional consciousness, we stumble upon this challenging puzzle. How can consciousness—be it either the one constituting according to the eidos-instantiation schema of the *LI* or the transcendental synthesizing one of the *Ideas I—as a part of the actual world, next to the ‘extended res,’ constitute both that latter and itself? Or, to put it otherwise (and solely in transcendental-synthesizing terms), if everything that is in the world has been or becomes constituted by transcendental consciousness, then how can this consciousness be a being within the overall world sphere? Who or what constituted it? Such a transcendental consciousness should be at the same time constituting (by its ‘definition’) and constituted (as one being within the sphere of beings). But this **does not make any sense**. This is something totally **unintelligible**.81 It presents us

81 See also *Hua* XXXIV, 481–6; *Hua* VI, §§52–54. Fink, in fact, bases his whole presentation of Husserl’s Transcendental Phenomenology exclusively on this (later) idea of an unintelligibility as arising in the context of the transcendental reduction (1970, 101, which is, however, developed in 114ff.). In the end, this is a problem regarding the phenomenologically justified content of a Phenomenological Egology, a problem with which Fink was deeply acquainted, and with which he had already struggled in his collaboration with Husserl for the so-called “Sixth Cartesian Meditation”; an effort that would solve the impasses that had blocked Husserl’s further development of the Phenomenological Egology contained in the Fifth Cartesian Meditation (1929). Here, a more transparent story is being presented. We will come back to the importance of this
with the enigma or paradox concerning human subjectivity: “being a subject for the world and at the same time being an object in the world” (Crisis, §53).

If Transcendental Phenomenology wants to become a true First Philosophy, then it must abandon even the last remaining bit of naiveté (of ‘unconsciously’ relying on self-understandable presuppositions). It must manage to really free itself from all traces belonging to the natural attitude. This means that it must find a way of elucidating the transcendentally synthesizing consciousness (to restrict ourselves here to this) in a way that no longer reads it as a part of the actual world or, seen otherwise, in a way that endows it with sound absoluteness. That is, a full-fledged and non-speculative Transcendental Phenomenology worthy of its name must realize that the transcendental consciousness discovered up to this point, in the context of its developing transcendental methodology, is in fact a mundane reality. It is a psychological-phenomenological psyche clumsily disguised as an absolute transcendental consciousness. As such, it cannot have any place within a complete Transcendental Phenomenology that sees all worldly actual beings as constituted in a rightly understood, transcendentally synthesizing consciousness. The hitherto adopted perspective of understanding transcendental consciousness needs to be abandoned.

In some way, an intelligible transcendental consciousness must be a horizon that somehow ‘encloses’ both the rest of the actual world and its mundane (psychological or naïve transcendental) self. Husserl then thought that, grasped in its fully appropriate sense, only a genuinely absolute consciousness, one cast in terms of monadology, seems to be the most suitable context for accommodating these later transcendental phenomenological perplexities.

### 2.7.3 Traces of the Developing Change

Husserl’s relevant inspiration toward this turn seems to have been Fichte, whose all-constituting “I” had supported Husserl’s transcendental journey already (probably around 1915 if not 1913), and Leibniz. It seems that in all likelihood, the first intimately relevant connection with Leibniz’s thought must have happened already, before 1910. In the early 1920s, Leibniz and monadology had been a systematically constant concern in Husserl’s writings and publications. Absolute transcendental consciousness is now conceived as an all-inclusive monad, qua complete stage upon

---

“unintelligibility” and to its connection with the quarrel between Husserl and Heidegger in Chap. 3, §3.10.

82 On this, see Kern 1964, 35–7, 292, 297; also Hart 1995.

83 See Schuhmann’s Husserl-Chronik (1977). For more details on Husserl’s adoption of basic Leibnizian schemes of thought, from “Philosophy as Rigorous Science” to his research manuscripts of 1937, see (Cristin 1990; Mertens 2000; MacDonald 2007). On the difficulties and the impasse that this mature, monadological, transcendental turn signals, see also Chap. 10, §10.4.
which the drama is played of the totally whole, transcendentally reduced actual world, as we experience it in lower- and higher-order intentionalities. Monadologically absolute consciousness, that is, constitutes not only the world transcendentally appearing to us, but also the worldly consciousness qua mundane psyche either in its eidetically or in its transcendentally functioning intentional constituting. In the monadologically absolute transcendental consciousness, the whole range and ranks of intentional correlations is constituted.

In the Crisis, the CM, and the “Britannica Article,” Husserl indeed clearly maintains that, in the end, the psychological ego or the mundanely understood, early transcendental ego, is only the self-objectification (Selbstobjektivierung) of the ultimate, always already functioning, anonymous (letztfungierende anonyme), fully monadological transcendental subjectivity. In other words, when the anonymous transcendental subjectivity understands itself naively, it actually objectifies itself as a mundane psyche (eidetically or synthesizingly constituting). It apprehends itself as a tiny edge in the world, left over from the positivity of the hardly eradicable natural attitude.

It must have been clear by now, then, that mundane transcendental consciousness, i.e., transcendental consciousness after the first conception of the transcendental turn (e.g., that about which Husserl still speaks in the Ideas I), can be both epistemologically successful (and thus find its proper place in an appropriately modified Phenomenological Psychology) and ontologically unsuccessful (and find its proper place in a pre-mondalological Transcendental Phenomenology). The latter unsuccessfulness, that is, can be lifted if we do not take the transcendently synthesizing consciousness to also constitute objectivities in their Being (thus leading to the “unintelligibility”), i.e., in case we approach it with only a phenomenologically-psychologically limited epistemological interest. From the point of view of Husserl’s later realizations, the merely epistemological Transcendental Phenomenology, i.e., a Phenomenological Psychology that has adopted the constituting model of the Ideas I, appears to be free from the defect of the aforementioned unintelligibility. This, of course, once again makes clear that there are in fact two kinds of Phenomenological Psychology, the Eidetic one of the LI and the Synthetic or Transcendentally-Functioning one of the

---

84See also Fink 1970, 133ff., 139f.
85See Hua VI, 115, 116, 156, 183, 186, 190; Hua IX, 274, 294; Hua I, 130, 136f, 157, 159, 168, 207 comment to 59.15, 208 comment to 60.33; Hua VII, 73; Hua XVII, 222f., 243. We will come back to the problems related with this possible conception of transcendental consciousness in Chaps. 3 and 10.
86To be sure, as must have already appeared, a ‘milder’ version of “unintelligibility” could be projected in the context of a Phenomenological Psychology referring to an intentional consciousness qua (mundane) psyche, which is intentionally constituting either according to the eidetic constituting model of the LI (Materie/instance in the act) or according to that of the Ideas I (time field of ‘transcendental’ syntheses). I mean by this the—either way suspended—psychophysical connection: whence the reell contents and whereupon the constituting functions? See also Chap. 10.
first transcendental period, which we can refer to as “mundane Transcendental Phenomenology.” Otherwise put, from the point of view of the Monadological or Radical Transcendental Phenomenology, Mundane Transcendental Phenomenology can in fact be seen as another valid version of Phenomenological Psychology (the version that understands intentional constitution in terms of syntheses).\(^87\)

Only with difficulty can the course of the just delineated change in Husserl’s maturation be unambiguously traced in the course of his thought. To my knowledge, there is no perfectly clear self-criticism about this on Husserl’s part. It seems, though, that some self-reflection or criticism after the publication of the *Ideas* I and before 1920 must have made Husserl realize the difficulty. From Fink (1970), though, we learn that in fact a criticism of this sort, actually stemming from the Neokantian camp, was launched against Husserl as late as 1930 and 1932.\(^88\) It seems that in the Neokantian tradition, the issue of the ontological status of the transcendentally constituting consciousness had always been at the center of their concerns. For example, in his *Allgemeine Psychologie* (1912), Natorp, with whom Husserl retained a close personal contact, starting at least from the time of the *LI*, had made a special effort to argue against the possibility that absolute constituting consciousness is in time, like all the rest of its objects.\(^89\) Husserl studied this work thoroughly, together with Natorp’s essay “*Philosophie und Psychologie*” (1913), in 1918.\(^90\) Thus, in all likelihood, Natorp, who was a key figure in Husserl’s abandonment of the ‘Platonist’ perspective (eidetic intentional constitution) as found in the *LI*, also played some role in Husserl’s further maturation and in his move from the mundane Transcendental Phenomenology of the *Ideas* I to the later radical, fully monadological Transcendental Phenomenology of the years following the early 1920s.

In this connection, it is also remarkable that there is a striking analogy in the two stages of Husserl’s maturation after the *LI*. This can be vividly displayed in the aporias that led to these two steps and to the developments following them. In the overcoming of the *LI*, the crucial question is: how could we presuppose self-standing realities like the species, when Phenomenology should be presuppositionless research into the origin of all objectivities and of all fundamental concepts? In the overcoming of the *Ideas* I, the crucial question is: how could we presuppose that after the transcendental reduction we are left with a consciousness seen as a mere worldly region or corner, when Transcendental Phenomenology should be an analysis regarding the constitution of all kinds of beings?

\(^87\)Naturally, this dimension of Husserl’s itinerary sheds a new light on the first round of elucidations and distinctions that were made above, in §§2.2–6.

\(^88\)See Fink 1970, 74ff, 145 n. 1, and especially, 92ff, 96f.

\(^89\)On Natorp’s influence upon Husserl after the publication of the *Ideas* I, see also Kern 1964, §31 and, especially, 348ff.

\(^90\)See Kern 1964, 350 n. 4.
2.7.4 Beyond Fink’s Advocacy of Husserl’s Transcendental Phenomenology

Fink, however, builds his advocacy of Husserlian Transcendental Phenomenology along a line of argumentation that, in its development, does not recognize any point at which transcendental consciousness was presented—if not also conceived—in a mundane perspective. That is, Fink retrospectively projects Husserl’s mature monadological understanding of transcendental consciousness back on the Ideas I and the relevant works after 1905 (or 1907). As I see it, though, this is a retrospective retouch that serves to hide some annoying abjured figures from the official picture presented to the public. And the additional difficulties in our understanding of Husserl’s progress and Phenomenology that this authoritative beautification created cannot be underestimated.

That we have to do with such a retouch and that the situation is very obscure and complicated to a degree that has prevented a full penetration into the adytum of its perplexities and a full reconstruction of a clear view of Husserl’s development can also be seen from the following. If we focus on the Ideas I, Husserl’s supposedly breakthrough transcendental phenomenological work, we come across many phrasings that tempt us to read them as clear statements of a fully monadological conception of transcendental consciousness. I will cite here, in particular, those passages that sound very much like the late 1920s remarks negating an understanding of transcendental consciousness as a small part or a small piece of the whole world.

[In the preceding sections (§§27–50) of the “Fundamental Considerations” in the Ideas I, we have] penetrated to the cognition that there is something like the field of pure consciousness, indeed, that there is such a thing which is not a component part of Nature [Bestandstück der Natur], and is so far from being that, that Nature is possible only as an intentional unity motivated in transcendentally pure consciousness by immanent connections. (Ideas I, 114–5/107–8; emphasis added)

91A line of reconstruction that is present also in De Boer (1978), cf. also Ricoeur 1967, 14–5, 24ff. To be sure, Fink makes an allusion to the fact that there is something problematic in the presentation of the transcendental reduction in Ideas I, but he considers this a matter of “inadequacy,” “inappropriateness,” “equivocality,” or “provisionality” and not of “literally negligence” (1970, 114, 120, 122, 130, 135, 136). A detailed and unprejudiced examination of the matter, however, shows that it is much more complicated. Moreover, as can be seen from Husserl’s self-corrections on his personal copies of the Ideas I (see Hua III.2), we are not dealing with mere mistakes in the presentation of clearly discovered ideas and phenomena, but with an incomplete and problematic conception of that early transcendental phenomenological methodology, which only later gets corrected in another direction. After all, Husserl was struggling to properly cope with the idea of the reductions even as late as 1936 (see his letter to his son Gerhart from February 20, 1936, where he says that only in the Crisis had he achieved the first lucid, all-sided, and clear presentation of “the” phenomenological reduction)! With all this, also, I do not mean to claim that Phenomenology can only be done in its monadological transcendental sense, and that we have to accommodate ourselves in its context. See also Chap. 10 in this book.
At first sight, this indeed sounds like an indisputable statement of Husserl’s later clear view that transcendental consciousness should not be some part of the whole world, but the all-encompassing, intentionally-transcendentally synthesizing condition for the possibility of this world. As usual, however, appearances are here deceptive. Husserl writes “Nature” not “World.” In fact, in the personal so-called “copy D” (1929) of the Ideas I, Husserl corrects the phrase “of Nature” so as to read “of the real world!”92 In the original Ideas I, we should not conceive of transcendental consciousness as a part of Nature, i.e., of physical reality (actuality)—not of the world as a whole! From the perspective of the 1920s, however, the fully monadological transcendental consciousness must not be conceived as a part of the world as a whole—not of physical reality (even as an alien attachment to it).

That, in the Ideas I, Husserl is in confusion with regard to that upon which the transcendental reduction may have its effects—does it apply to Nature, to transcendent ‘realities,’ or to the totality of the world?—can be seen also at other points. In §33 of the first edition of that work, Husserl writes the following.

What can remain, if the whole world, including ourselves with all our cogitare, is excluded? (Ideas I, 63/66)

Sometime in the early 1920s, however, in his so-called “copy A” Husserl added this marginal note on this point:

Is the world-all [Weltall] not the “all” of whatever exists [des Seienden überhaupt]? Is there any sense to ask for that which “remains” [was “übrig” bleibt]? As a matter of fact [and from the fully monadological point of view], the expression is objectionable because, having been taken from the world of sensuous reality [read: Nature], it carries with it the thought of doing away with one part of a whole, one part of a real context. [From the fully monadological point of view], [t]he question may, however, still have a legitimate sense when stated in the form: What can still be posited as Being [Sein] if the world-all, the “all” of reality, remains parenthesized? [The answer should be: what remains is the full monadological consciousness.] (Ideas I, 63 n. 3/485; emphasis added)

Perhaps the most convincing evidence is found in the very text of the original edition of the Ideas I. On the one hand, Husserl describes the world from the perspective of the natural attitude, including indeed in it the natural world and every human being qua—mundane—human being (be that the one describing the world from the first person perspective or all the other human beings that are given to that person). Moreover, when he prepares us for the introduction to the transcendental epoché and reduction, he explicitly notes that to the meaning of this double process pertains its universality.93 Thus, the reader may be excused for

---

92See Ideas I, 115, n. 46/Hua III.2, 500. That, in the 1920s, Husserl corrected the Ideas I so as to upgrade them to a fully monadological transcendental level may be seen also from his corrections in §51 and elsewhere. The term “mundane” moreover, appears just once in the Ideas I (Hua III.1, 109; the English translation has it as “worldly”) and refers to a totally irrelevant subject matter. In all likelihood, this absence signifies that at that time, Husserl hadn’t yet arrived at a clear-cut distinction between the mundane and the fully monadological transcendental (but only to that between the natural and the—unknowably so—mundane transcendental).

93This is the story developed in Ideas I, §§27–31.
becoming confident that the reconstruction offered by Fink (and Husserl) (1933) and followed by erudite Phenomenology scholars like De Boer 1978, maintaining that already in the Ideas I transcendental reduction leaves us with an a-regional,\(^{94}\) fully monadological transcendental consciousness, is beyond questionability. On the other hand, though, we are immediately caught by surprise.

But with good reason we limit the universality of that [transcendental epoché and reduction]. [...] [I]f it were as comprehensible as possible, then no province would be left for [transcendently] unmodified judgments, to say nothing of a province for science [i.e., Phenomenology as a rigorous science, that would have transcendental consciousness as it proper object “province”]. But our purpose is to discover a new scientific domain [namely, Phenomenology, that will provide us with pure rigorous truths about that which will be left as a residual ontological province after the performance of the suitably restricted transcendental reduction, i.e., of the transcendently pure intentional consciousness]. [...] [Therefore] [w]e put out of action the general positing which belongs to the essence of the natural attitude [...] [as especially limited to] the whole natural world. (Ideas I, 60–1/65; second emphasis added)

In the Ideas I, if Phenomenology wants to secure its proper field of research, it must in a way limit the possible universality of the transcendental reduction so as to leave behind, as its residue, transcendental consciousness in the sense of a special region of Being, forgotten in the darkness of some dusty corner of the world.\(^{95}\) Once again, the latent mundane perspective is panegyrically tracked and uncovered within the constitutional text of Transcendental Phenomenology.

Even though the term “monad” indeed appears sporadically at the time of the “Philosophy as a Rigorous Science” and the Ideas I, it does not have its full monadological, i.e., a-regional, transcendental sense. In those works, Husserl’s conception of the transcendently functioning consciousness in terms of monad did not go beyond seeing it as a unity of a self-enclosed time-field, within which intentional constitution happens (in passive and active ways).\(^{96}\) Self-enclosure is one characteristic of the monad as unity; a characteristic, nevertheless, that does not yet secure its non-mundaneity.\(^{97}\) The other, and most important characteristic

---

\(^{94}\)See Fink 1970, 122; De Boer 1978, 431. See also note 97 below.

\(^{95}\)Cf., however, Fink 1970, 112.

\(^{96}\)See Ideas I, 193ff./182ff., 283f./273f.

\(^{97}\)De Boer, mostly following Fink (1933), sees only one mundane, connected with the psychological intentional consciousness of Phenomenological Psychology, the psychological psyche (see De Boer 1978, 168, 175, 245–6, 410). We have seen, however, that mundane may also be the transcendentally functioning or synthesizing intentional consciousness. Otherwise put, the transcendentally functioning, mundane psyche is, properly speaking, nothing else than a (post-eidetic) psychological psyche, the psyche of the Eidetic Phenomenological Psychology that now constitutes otherwise. And this was the case in Husserl’s Transcendental Phenomenology before the 1920s. De Boer gives us excellent description of the final transcendental reduction and of its outcome: “[What] remains after the transcendental reduction is being itself. It is not the correlate of a mundane consciousness regarded as a region; it is rather the correlate of an a-regional consciousness that is the origin of all regions.” (1978, 431; emphasis added). He, however, projects this later post-1920 view even back on the Ideas I. In the Ideas I, though, Husserl still refers to transcendental consciousness as a residuum, as a sphere of Being, and even as a region of Being.
of a specifically monadological unity, is all-inclusiveness; inclusiveness even of its empirical bodily and psychological, self-objectified version of itself.\footnote{It is probably this unnoticed transition that makes De Boer actually notice that, at least in the \textit{Idea} (1907), the reduction has a “psychological flavour” (see above note 57). Something analogous, however, must be said even for the “Philosophy as a Rigorous Science” (1911), where, in fact, Husserl uses for the first time the term “monad,” and the \textit{Idea} I (1913). Especially with regard to the view that by “Rigorous Science” Phenomenological Psychology is actually meant, see a further confirmation in \textit{Hua XXXIV}, 4.} It is only on this count that the non-mundaneity of the full-fledged, a-regional, monadological, transcendental consciousness has been attained. Before the 1920s, intentional transcendence was effectuated as a transgressing and overcoming of the limits of the abysmal trench surrounding the ‘monad’ as regional self-enclosure, as the entity characterized by “immanent Being.”\footnote{See \textit{Idea} I, 110/104.}

From the 1920s point of view, Husserl can see that the epoché and the reduction, understood as “exclusion” of reality, can only mean that transcendental consciousness, which is meant to be left intact after these methodological processes, is left as a mere \textit{residuum}, as a tiny stretch or tiny region of the previous world-all. And this led to the serious unintelligibility that Husserl explicitly thematized in the “\textit{Britannica} Article.” From the perspective of the fully comprehended monadological transcendental turn, Husserl’s aporetic question in copy A, “What can still be posited as Being [\textit{Sein}] if the world-all, the ‘all’ of reality, remains parenthesized?” (\textit{Ideas} I, 63 n. 3/\textit{Hua} III.2, 485) is fully understandable. Nonetheless, it should have been phrased in a clearer way, so as to move us away from seeing transcendental consciousness as something ‘positive’ standing there (“What can still be posited”), curled down in a corner of the previous world status. We should have been more clearly directed to view it as a total time-like hyper-horizon, within which the happening of the constitution of us qua subjects—having the experience of the actual world and of the founded objectities—occurs. We are, nonetheless, instructed to ask what remains if we are not to exclude just Nature, but to parenthesize the world in its totality. In this case, of course, as the fully monadological Transcendental Phenomenology teaches us, what is left is indeed the \textit{unitary horizon wherein all the functioning and possible intentional correlations take effect} (including the one that I now currently happen to be in, e.g., my currently perceiving that tree over there, or thinking the Pythagorean theorem, together with all my recorded past, my acquired habitualities, and my vaguely projected future in the context of a human community, etc.).
Many other corrections and marginal notes from Husserl’s personal copies indicate the serious change that his thought underwent in its passing from the Ideas I to the way he started reflecting on the issue of transcendental subjectivity in the 1920s.

Naturally, all these back-and-forths with regard to the meaning of the transcendental consciousness as a residuum of the transcendental reduction have their repercussions in the way Husserl conceives of the status of Psychological Phenomenology and Transcendental Phenomenology and the relation between them. And it is no longer a self-evident truth that the progress with regard to the first issue always finds a faithful reflection on the second. In his “Britannica Article,” Husserl managed to attain a clearer view of how to separate the two ‘transcendental’ perspectives reconstructed above. Nevertheless, he could not as yet clearly distinguish Science, which, generally speaking, is an a priori or and a posteriori research of a certain delimited region of beings, from (First) Philosophy, which is not research of such a fraction of what is, but general—even if not necessarily also formal—research into the possibility and constitution of Being and beings of all sorts. Transcendental Phenomenology as First Philosophy (or, let me repeat it, Fundamental Ontology) is not research into the (eidetic or synthesizing) psychic as a region of beings, but into the transcendental syntheses as such or, better, of the intentional correlations as such, i.e., of the field of emptily aiming and of intuitionally fulfilling time-syntheses. It is only now that Transcendental Phenomenology can properly speak about consciousness’ syntheses as happenings in an a-regional time-field. And of course, then, this transcendental consciousness is in no way identical with the regional Cartesian ego or the regional psychic consciousness of either the LI or the Ideas I. Finally, under the conditions here exhibited, Husserl can easily claim that, epistemologically speaking, the analyses of Phenomenological Psychology (Eidetic or Synthetic) can be turned into analyses of Transcendental Phenomenology “word for word” (Hua IX, 266, 270). Ontologically, however, the meaning of these words has been drastically and decisively changed; they bear a totally different sign (Hua IX, 247–8).

---

100 For a moment of relative clarity on this, see, e.g., Hua IX, 253.

101 See also Fink 1970, 119ff., where we can excavate such a distinction between Phenomenological Psychology as a regional science of the mundane psychic and Transcendental Phenomenology as an all-encompassing First Philosophy.
Husserl and Heidegger on Reduction, Primordiality, and the Categorial Phenomenology Beyond its Original Divide
Theodorou, P.
2015, XXVI, 381 p. 1 illus., Hardcover
ISBN: 978-3-319-16621-6