Table of Contents
The Pursuit of Being xlvii (3)
PART ONE: THE PROBLEM OF NOTHINGNESS 1 (31)
Chapter One. The Origin of Negation 3 (33)
I. The Question 3 (33)
II. Negations 6 (36)
III. The Dialectical Concept of Nothingness 12 (44)
IV. The Phenomenological Concept of Nothingness 16 (49)
V. The Origin of Nothingness 21 (56)
Chapter Two. Bad Faith 47 (86)
I. Bad Faith and Falsehood 47 (86)
II.. Patterns of Bad Faith 55 (96)
III. The "Faith" of Bad Faith 67 (112)
PART 1WO: BEING-FOR-ITSELF
Chapter One. Immediate Structures of the For-Itself 73 (119)
I. Presence to Self 73 (119)
II. The Facticity of the For-Itself 79 (127)
III. The For-Itself and the Being of Value 84 (133)
IV. The For-Itself and the Being of Possibilities 95 (147)
V. The Self and the Circuit of Selfness 102 (155)
Chapter Two. Temporality 107 (159)
I. Phenomenology of the Three Temporal Dimensions 107 (159)
II. The Ontology of Temporality 130 (187)
III. Original Temporality and Psychic Temporality: Reflection 150 (211)
Chapter Three. Transcendence 171 (238)
I. Knowledge as a Type of Relation Between the For-Itself and the In-Itself 172 (240)
II. Determination as Negation 180 (249)
III. Quality and Quantity Potentiality, Instrumentality 186 (257)
IV. The Time of the World 204 (279)
V. Knowledge 216 (294)
PART THREE: BEING-FOR-OTHERS
Chapter One. The Existence of Others 221 (301)
I. The Problem 221 (301)
II. The Reef of Solipsism 223 (303)
III. Husser!, Hegel, 'Heidegger 233 (315)
IV. The Look 252 (340)
Chapter Two. The Body 303 (401)
I. The Body as Being-For-Itself: Facticity 306 (404)
II. The Body-For-Others 339 (445)
III. The Third Ontological Dimension of the Body 351 (460)
Chapter Three. Concrete Relations With Others 361 (471)
I. First Attitude Toward Others: Love, Language, Masochism 364 (474)
II. Second Attitude Toward Others: Indifference, Desire, Hate, Sadism 379 (494)
III. "Being-With" (Mitsein) and the "We" 413 (534)
PART FOUR: HAVING, DOING AND BEING.
Chapter One. Being and Doing: Freedom 433 (559)
I. Freedom: The First Condition of Action 433 (559)
II. Freedom and Facticity: The Situation 481 (619)
III. Freedom and Responsibility 553 (707)
Chapter Two. Doing and Having 557 (712)
I. Existential Psychoanalysis 557 (712)
II. "Doing" and "Having" Possession ) 575 (734)
III. Quality as a Revelation of Being 600 (765)
I. In-Itself and For-Itself: Metaphysical Implications 617 (785)
II. Ethical Implications 625 (795)
Key to Special Terminology 629 (799)
Index 637 (809)
Excerpt and condensation
In an article called "La Transcendance de I'Ego. Esqnisse d'nne description phenomenologique" (1936) Sartre, while keeping within the general province of phenomenology, challenged Busserl's concept of the transcendental Ego. …. Most important is Sartre's rejection of the primacy of the Cartesian cogito. He objects that in Descartes' formula-"I think; therefore I am"-the consciousness which says, "I am," is not actually the consciousness which thinks. Instead we are dealing with a secondary activity. ….
When we catch a glimpse of an object, there may be a doubting consciousness of the object as uncertain. But … Cartesian cogito is not one with the doubting consciousness but has reflected upon it. In other words this cogito is not Descartes doubting; it is Descartes reflecting upon the doubting. "I doubt; therefore I am" is really "I am aware that I doubt; therefore I am."
These conclusions lead Sartre to establish the pre-reflective cogito as the primary consciousness, and in all of his later work he makes this his original point of departure.
In this same article Sartre lays down two fundamental principles concerning the pre-reflective consciousness which are basic in his later work. First, he follows Husserl in holding that all consciousness is consciousness of something; that is, consciousness is intentional and directive, pointing to a transcendent object other than itself. Here is the germ for Sartre's later view of man's being-in-the-world, for his "ontological proof" of the existence of a Being-in-itself which is external to consciousness. Secondly, the pre-reflective cogito is non-personal. It is not true that we can start with some such statement as "I am conscious of the chair." All that we can truthfully say at this beginning stage is that "there is (il y a) consciousness of the chair." The Ego (including both the "I" and the "Me") docs not come into existence until the original consciousness has been made the object of reflection. Thus there is never an Ego consciousness but only consciousness of the Ego. This is, of course, another reason for Sartre's objecting to the primacy of the Cartesian cogito, for Descartes was actually trying to prove the existence of the "I."
According to Sartre, the Ego is not in consciousness, which is utterly translucent, but in the world; and like the world it is the object of consciousness. This is not, of course, to say that the Ego is material but only that it is not a subject which in some sense manipulates or directs consciousness. Strictly speaking, we should never say "my consciousness" but rather “consciousness of me."
Both "world" and "Ego" are transcendent objects-in reality, ideal unities.
Three consequences of this position should perhaps be noted in particular, one because it is a view which Sartre later explicitly abandoned, the other two form the basis for some of the most significant sections of Being and Nothingness.
First, Sartre claims that once we put the "I" out of consciousness and into the world (in the sense that it is now the object and not the subject of consciousness) we have defeated any argument for solipsism. ….. Later, as we shall see, Sartre rejected this as a refutation of solipsism and declared that neither my own existence nor that of the Other can be "proved" but that both are "factual necessities" which we can doubt only abstractly.
Second, Sartre believes that by taking the "I" and the "Me" out of consciousness and by viewing consciousness as absolute and non-personal, and as responsible for the constitution of Being "as a world" and of its own activities as an Ego, he has defended phenomenology against any charge that it has taken refuge from the real world in an idealism. If the Ego and the world are both objects of consciousness, if neither has created the other, then consciousness by establishing their relations to each other insures the active participation of the person in the world.
Most important of all, there are in Sartre's claim that consciousness infinitely overflows the "I" which ordinarily serves to unify it, the foundation for his view of anguish, the germ of his doctrine of "bad faith," and a basis for his belief in the absolute freedom of consciousness.
"Consciousness is afraid of its own spontaneity because it feels itself to be beyond freedom." In other words we feel vertigo or anguish before our recognition that nothing in our own pasts or discernible personality insures our following any of our usual patterns of conduct. There is nothing to prevent consciousness from making a wholly new choice of its way of being. By means of the Ego, consciousness can partially protect itself from this freedom so limitless that it threatens the very bounds of personality.
"Everything happens as if consciousness constituted the Ego as a false image of itself, as if consciousness were hypnotized by this Ego which it has established and were absorbed in it."
Here undeveloped is the origin of bad faith, the possibility which consciousness possesses of wavering back and forth, demanding the privileges of a free consciousness, yet seeking refuge from the responsibilities of freedom by pretending to be concealed and confined in an already established Ego.
In The Psychology of the Imagination, a treatise on phenomenological psychology which was published in 1940, we find the basis for Sartre's later presentation of, Nothingness. …….
Throughout the book Sartre has been stressing the fact that in imagination object is posited either as absent, as non-existent, as existing elsewhere, or as neutralized (i.e., not posited as existing). Now in order to effect such a positing, consciousness must exercise its peculiar power of nihilation. If an object is to be posited as absent or not existing, then there must be involved the ability to constitute an emptiness or nothingness with respect to it. Sartre goes further than this and says that in every act of imagination there is really a double nihilation. In this connection he makes an important distinction between being-in-the-world and being-in-the-midst-of-the-world. To be in-the-midst-of-the-world is to be one with the world as in the case of objects. But consciousness is not in-the-midst-of-the-world; it is in-the-world. This means that consciousness is inevitably involved with the world (both because we have bodies and because by definition consciousness is consciousness of a transcendent object) but that there is a separation between consciousness and the things in the world.
For consciousness in its primary form, as we saw earlier, is a non-positional self-consciousness; hence if consciousness is consciousness of an object, it is consciousness of not being the object. There is, in short, a power of withdrawal in consciousness such that it can nihilate (encase with a region of non-being) the objects of which it is conscious. Imagination requires two of these nihilating acts. When we imagine, we posit a world in which an object is not present_ in order that we may imagine a world in which our imagined object is present. I do not imagine a tree so long as I am actually looking at one. To accomplish this imagining act, we must first be able to posit the world as a synthetic totality. This is possible only for a consciousness capable of effecting a nihilating withdrawal from •the world. Then we posit the imagined object as existing somehow apart from the world, thus denying it as being part of the existing world.
Hence the imaginative act is constituting, isolating, and nihilating. It constitutes the world as a world, for before consciousness there was no "world" but only full, undifferentiated being. It then nihilates the world from a particular point of view and by a second act of nihilation isolates the object from the world-as out-of-reach.
In this early book Sartre had already linked the ideas of Nothingness and freedom. "In order to imagine, consciousness must be free from all specific reality and this freedom must be able to define itself by a "being-in-the-world which is--at-once the constitution and the negation of the world." (p. 269) This means that consciousness must be able to effect the emergence of the "unreaL" "The unreal is produced outside of the world by a consciousness which stays in the world, and it is becal1se he is transcendentally free that man can imagine." (p. 271)
In The Emotions (1939) Sartre again discusses consciousness' constitution and organization of the world and from a different point of view, but the underlying ideas of the total involvement of consciousness in any of its acts and its possibility of choosing freely the way in which it will relate itself to the world remain the same. As we should expect, he completely rejects the idea that emotions are forces which can sweep over one and determine consciousness and its actions. Emotion is simply away by which consciousness chooses to live its relationship to the world. ……… ……….
In summary, emotion is a consciousness' personal relation to the world and as such can be temporarily satisfying, but it is fundamentally ineffective and transient with no direct power to affect the environment.
In the three works just considered Sartre shows clearly that he is not following very c1ose1y the line of thought laid down by Husserl and his followers although in all three, as well as in the case of Being and Nothingness, Sartre calls his approach phenomenological. In these examples, however, we find very little of what we have become accustomed to think of as inseparably connected with existentialism-namely, a concern with the living person and his concrete emotions of anguish, despair, nausea, and the like. Actually, until the publication of Being and Nothingness, Sartre's concern with men's happiness and unhappiness, their ethical problems, purposes, and conduct was expressed largely in his purely literary works. Of these the novel, Nausea (1937), is richest in philosophical content. In fact one might truthfully say that the only full exposition of its meaning would be the total volume of Being and Nothingness. But amidst the wealth of material which might serve as a sort of book of illustrations for existentialist motifs there are two things of particular significance. First there is the realization on the part of the hero, Roquentin, that Being in general and he himself in particular are de trop; that is, existence itself is contingent, gratuitous, unjustifiable. It is absurd in the sense that there is no reason for it, no outside purpose to give it meaning, no direction. Being is there, and outside of it-Nothing. In the passage in which this thought is especially developed we find Roquentin struggling with the idea that things overflow all the relationships and designations which he can attach to them, a view which Sartre developed later in the form of a theory of the "transphenomenality of Being." Furthermore Roquentin realizes that since he is an existent he can not escape this original contingency, this "obscene superfluity."
In the later work Sartre sharply contrasts this unconscious being with Being-for-itself or consciousness. But the contingency which Roquentin expresses still remains in the fact that while the For-itself is free to choose its way of being, it was never able either to choose not to be, or to choose not to be free. Nor is there any meaning for its being, other than what it makes for itself.
A second important theme in the novel is the concept of nausea itself. Nausea is the "taste of my facticity," the revelation of my body to me and of the fact of my inescapable connection with Being-in-itself.
In Being and Nothingness it is in connection with the study of facticity that he presents the most detailed analysis of the problem of freedom, for it is the limitations offered by man's connections with external being which offer the most serious threat to Sartre's view that the For-itself is absolutely free.
In Being and Nothingness, which as L'Etre et Ie Neant appeared in France in 1943, Sartre has incorporated the views which I have mentioned here as well as a number of less important themes found in scattered short stories and essays. The basic positions have not been really changed, but they have been enriched and elaborated and worked into a systematic philosophy. The subject matter of this philosophy is as all inclusive as the title indicates, and throughout a large part of the book the treatment is fully as abstract. Yet we might also say that it is a study of the human condition; for since "man is the being by whom Nothingness comes into the world:' this means that man himself is Being and Nothingness. And before he has finished, Sartre has not only considered such concrete problems as love, hate, sex, the crises of anguish, the trap of bad faith, but he has sketched in outline an approach by which we may hope to ascertain the original choice of Being by which real individuals have made themselves what they are.
The underlying plan of this comprehensive description is comparatively simple. In the Introduction, which is by far the most difficult part of the book, Sartre explains why we must begin with the pre-reflective consciousness, contrasts his position with that of realism and of idealism, rejects any idea of a noumenal world behind the phenomenon, and explains his own idea of the "transphenomenality of Being." He then proceeds to present his distinction between unconscious Being (Being-in-itself) and conscious Being (Being-for-itself). Obviously certain difficulties arise. In particular, since the two types are radically different and separated from another, how can they both be part of one Being?
In search of an answer Sartre in Part One focuses on the question itself-as a question-and reveals the fact that man (or the For-itself) can ask questions and can be in question for himself in his very being because of the presence in him of a Nothingness. Further examination of this Nothingness shows that Non-being is the condition of any transcendence toward Being. But how can man be his own Nothingness and be responsible for the upsurge of Nothingness into the world? We learn that Nothingness is revealed to us most fully in anguish and that man generally tries to flee this anguish, this Nothingness which he is, by means of "bad faith." The study of "bad faith" reveals to us that whereas Being-in-itself simply is, man is the being "who is what he is not and who is not what he is." In other words man continually makes himself. Instead of being, he "has to be"; his present being has meaning only in the light of the future toward which he projects himself. Thus he is not what at any instant we might want to say that he is, and he is that toward which he projects himself but which he is not yet. This ambiguity provides the possibility for bad faith since man may try to interpret this evanescent "is" of his as though it were the "is" of Being-in-itself, or he may fluctuate between the two.
In Part Two Sartre, using this view of the For-itself as a Nothingness and as an always future project, discusses the For-itself as a pursuit of Being in the form of selfness. This involves the questions of possibility, of value, and of temporality, all of which prove to be integrally related to the basic concept of the For-itself as an internal negation of Being-in-itself. But if the For-itself is a relation to the In-itself, even by way of negation, then we must find some sort of bridge. This bridge is knowledge, the discussion of which concludes Part Two.
Since no full presentation of knowledge is possible without consideration of the senses, we are referred to the body. Part Three begins with a discussion of the body, and we soon perceive that one of the principal characteristics of a body is that it causes me to be seen by the Other. Hence Part Three is largely devoted to the study of Being-for-others, including descriptions of concrete personal relations. Finally our discovery of our relations with others shows us that the For-itself has an outside, that while never able to coincide with the In-itself, the For-itself is nevertheless in the midst of it. And so at last in Part Four we return to the In-itself.
We are concerned with the In-itself from two fundamental points of view. First, how can we be in the midst of the In-itself without losing our freedom. Here we find the fullest exposition of Sartre's ideas on freedom and facticity. Second, we discover that our fundamental relation to Being is such that we desire to appropriate it through either action, possession, or the attempt to become one with it. Analysis of these reactions leads us to the question of our original choice of Being, and it is here that Sartre outlines for us his existential psychoanalysis. This completes the book save for the Conclusion, in which Sartre suggests various metaphysical and ethical implications which may emerge as the result of his long "pursuit of Being" and also promises us another work in which he will further develop the ethical possibilities.
Obviously the most strikingly original idea here presented. as well as the unifying motif of the entire work, is the position that consciousness is a Nothingness. Yet as a Nothingness it is also a revelation of Being.
Aside from the paradoxical nature of this position, we are immediately puzzled as to how to relate it to the traditional theories of idealism and realism; …. Sartre himself believes that he can hold a theory not open to the objections generally directed against either of the others.
His philosophy is not idealism, not even Husserl's brand of idealism, as he points out, because Being in no way creates consciousness or is in any way dependent on consciousness for its existence. Being is already there, without reason or justification. It is not exhausted by any or by all of its appearances, though it is fully there in each one of its appearances. (That is, it does not serve as a sort of phenomenon with a noumenon behind it.) It always overflows whatever knowledge we have of it-just as it is presupposed by all our questions and by consciousness itself. This "transphenomenality of Being" means that the object of consciousness is always outside and transcendent, that there is forever a resistance, a limit offered to consciousness, an external something which must be taken into consideration.
Nevertheless we have not substituted a realistic position for the idealistic. For without consciousness, Being does not exist either as a totality (in the sense of "the world," "the universe") or with differentiated parts. It is a fullness of existence, a plenitude which can not possibly isolate one part so as to contrast it with another, or posit a whole over against its parts, or conceive a "nothing" in opposition to which it is "everything.” It is simply undifferentiated, meaningless massivity. Without consciousness there would not be a world, mountains, rivers, tables, chairs, etc.; there would be only Being. In this sense there is no thing without consciousness, but there is not nothing. Consciousness causes there to be things because it is itself nothing. Only through consciousness is there differentiation, meaning, and plurality for Being.
There is a tendency among some of Sartre's critics to criticize him for this view of consciousness as negativity as though it were somehow a slight to the dignity of the human being and made things more important than people. Such an objection seems unreasonable in the light of the tremendous consequences of this Nothingness.
The more difficult problem, as it seems to me, is how to account for these consequences without being false to the premise that consciousness is wholly negative; that is, without making it into a very formidable something. For when Sartre speaks of a Nothingness, he means just that and is not using the word as a misleading name for a new metaphysical substance. Yet the power to effect a Nothingness, to recognize and make use of it appears to be a positivity. If this power belongs to the For-itself, are we falling into a contradiction? And if the For-itself is a Nothingness, then in what sense is it Being?
In the Conclusion Sartre provides us with a helpful comparison by reminding us of a scientific fiction sometimes used to illustrate the physical principle of the conservation of energy. The For-itself has no reality except in so far as it is the nihilation of Being. …..
Being-in-itself is logically prior to Being-for-itself, that the latter is dependent on Being-in-itself, both in its origin and in its continued history.
In the original nihilation the For-itself is made-to-be (est été) by the In-itself. Nothing external to Being caused the rupture in the self-identity of Being-in-itself. It occurred somehow in Being. Thus the For-itself would be a mere abstraction withont Being, for it is nothing save the emptiness of this Being and hence is not an autonomous substance. It is unseIbstandig. (p. 619) "But as a nihilation it is; and it is in a priori unity with the In-itself." (p. 621)
In an effort to make this point more clear, Sartre points out that if we tried to imagine what "there was" before a world existed, we could not properly answer "nothing" without making both the "nothing" and the "before" retroactive. That is, Nothing has no meaning without Being, for it is that which is Other than Being. It there were somehow no Being, Nothing would concomitantly disappear. (p. 16) As the emptiness of a particular Being, every negation (by a reversal of Spinoza's famous statement) is a determination. Nothingness takes on a kind of borrowed being. In itself it is not, but it gets its efficacy concretely from Being. "Nothingness can nihilate itself only on the foundation of being; if nothingness can be given, it is neither before nor after being, nor in a general way outside of being. Nothingness lies coiled in the heart of being-like a worm." (p. :2.1) Thus Being-in-itself is logically prior to Being-for-itself; for the In-itself has no need of Nothingness since it is a plenitude, but the For-itself originates only by means of Being and as a rupture at the heart of Being.
Moreover the For-itself is dependent on the In-itself not only in its origin but in its continued existence. We have seen that consciousness is a revelation of Being and that this is because consciousness can make a Nothingness slip in between itself and Being or between the various parts of Being, thus bringing about a differentiation. We 'saw also in connection with The Psychology of the Imagination that this ability on the part of consciousness to separate itself from the world by a nihilation enabled it to effect the emergence of the unreal, thus to distinguish between actual and possible, between image and perception, etc.
It is important to recall that Sartre says of man that he is "the being by whom nothingness comes into the world." He does not deny to man any connection with being. Having noticed how the For-itself is dependent on the In-itself, we can perhaps see more clearly how Sartre can both declare that the For-itself is nothing and yet treat it as if it were a subdivision of Being and devote a volume of more than seven hundred pages to a discussion of its nature and consequences.
By itself the For-itself is nothing at all and is not even conceivable, just as a reflection or a shadow which would not be a reflection or shadow of anything could not be conceived. But in relation to being, by being the nothingness of a particular being and thus deriving from the being which it nihilates a sort of marginal, dependent being, it can give a new significance to all of Being. Thus the For-itself is without any of that fullness of being which we call the In-itself, but as a nihilation it is.
Sartre summarizes this position by saying, "For consciousness there is no being except for this precise obligation to be a revealing intuition of something." (p. 618) Immediately he recognizes that this definition is closely parallel to Plato's category of the Other as described in the Sophist. We note that with Plato, too, Otherness has no being except its being-other, but as Other it is. In PIato's description we note also the Other's characteristic of marginal or borrowed being, the trick of disappearing if considered by itself, its complete separation from Being at the same time that it cannot exist independently from Being. Sartre feels that Plato failed to see the logical consequence of his position, which would be that such an "otherness" could exist only in the form of consciousness. "For the only way in which the other can exist as other is to be consciousness '(of) being other.
Being and Nothingness
In Summary Form
Freedom is the nature of man; in anxiety man becomes aware of his freedom, knows himself responsible for his own being by commitment, seeks the impossible reunion with being-in-itself, and in despair knows himself forever at odds with the “other” who by their glances can threaten a man, turning him into a mere object.
In Sartre’s phenomenological ontology there is nothing concealed behind the phenomena or the appearances. The appearances embody full reality. They are indicative of themselves and refer to nothing but themselves. The Kantian dualism of phenomena and naumena, appearance and reality, is abolished, and being is made coextensive with phenonena. Husserl’s hypothesis of a transcendal ego is pronounced useless and disastrous – such view is shipwreck on the “reef of solipsism”.
Sartre’s analysis is markedly informed by Heideggerian concepts. Yet Heidegger, he argues, neglects the phenomenon of the lived body, has no explanation for the concrete relatedness of selves, and misinterprets the existential significance of death.
Being, in Sartre’s analysis, evinces a transphenomenal character.
There is no noumena and no thing-in-itself which lies concealed behind the phenomenal appearances of being. ……….
Although being is reduced to the whole of its phenomenal manifestations, it is never exhausted by any of its phenomenal aspects; no particular perspective reveals the entire character of being. All phenomena overflow themselves, suggesting other phenomena yet to be disclosed.
This primordial being, transphenomenal in character, expresses a fundamental rupture into “being-in-itself (en-soi) and “being-for-itself” (pour-soi).
Being-in-itself designates being in the mode of fullness or plenitude. It is fixed, complete, wholly given, devoid of potency and becoming, absolutely contingent, with no reason for its being; it is roughly equivalent to the inert world of objects and things. ….. It is superfluous (de trop),… and without connection with any other being.
Being-for-itself is fluid and vacuous rather than fixed and full. It is characterized by incompleteness, indeterminate, and potency; it corresponds to the being of human consciousness.
Being-in-itself is both logically and ontologically prior to being-for-itself; the latter is dependent upon the former for its origin.
Being-for-itself is derived from being-id-itself by an act of nihilation (néantisation). Being-for-itself thus constitutes a nihilation of being-in-itself. Being-for itself makes its appearance as a nothingness which “lies coiled in the heart of being – like a worm”. …. The for-itself simply finds itself there, separated and at a distance from the absolute fullness of the in-itself.
One of the fateful consequence of the primordial rupture of the for-itself from the in-itself is the introduction of nothingness.
Sartre makes it clear that it is through man or human conscious that nothingness comes into the world. In his discussion on nothingness Sartre is intent upon rejecting the Hegelian dialectical approach and substituting for it a phenomenological account. For Hegel, being and nothingness are dialectical concepts which take their rise from the same ontological level of mediated reality. Sartre maintains in his phenomenological approach that nothingness is dependent upon being in a way that being is not dependent upon nothingness.
Nothingness is not an abstract idea complementary to being, nor can it be conceived outside of being; it must be given at the heart of being. Nothingness demands a host, possessing the plentitude and full positivity of being, from which it borrows it power of nihilation.. Thus, nothingness has only a borrowed or marginal being…. Sartre’s analysis seems to draw from Augustinian sources. Augustine had already described evil as a tendency toward nothingness, the movement presupposing perfect being as a host in which evil exists as a privation of the good.
As Heidegger had done before him, Sartre insists that nothingness is the origin and foundation of negative judgments, rather than vice versa. This foundation finds its clarification in the context of human expectations and projects.
As an example, Sartre tells of expecting to find a person (Pierre) in a café when in fact he is not present: …… ……….
....... ........... ………. ……….
To make the negative judgment that Pierre is not in the café has purely abstract meaning. It is without real or efficacious foundation.
It is through man that nothingness comes into the world. The question is: what is it about the being of man that occasions nothingness? The answer is: freedom.
Freedom is the “nature” of man. There is no difference between the being of man and his being-free. Sartre’s ontology of man is a philosophy of radical and total freedom.
This consciousness of freedom is disclosed in anxiety. “It is in anxiety that man gets the consciousness of his freedom. It is in anxiety that freedom is, in its being, in question of itself”.
There is thus an internal connection among nothingness, freedom, and anxiety. These are inter-related structural determinants of the being of man.
Nothingness, freedom, and anxiety provide the conditions which make possible the movement of “bad faith” (mauvaise foi). Bad faith is a form of self-deception which in making use of freedom denies it. Bad faith is akin to lying, yet not identical with it. In lying one hides the truth from others. In bad faith one hides the truth from oneself. In the former there is a duality of deceiver and deceived; in the latter there is a unity of a single consciousness. Bad faith does not come from the outside. Consciousness affects itself with it.
In describing the pattern of bad faith Sartre develops the example of a woman who consents to go out with an amorous suitor. …… ……..
........ .......... .......... .........
The pursuit of being leads to an awareness of nothingness, nothingness to an awareness of freedom, freedom to bad faith, and bad faith to the being of consciousness which provides the condition for its possibility. We are thus led to an interrogation of the immediate structures of the for-itself as consciousness. The immediate consciousness in which the self experiences presence is what Sartre calls the nonpositional conscious. This consciousness characterizes the level of primitive awareness, and is prior to the positional consciousness which is the reflective consciousness of the intentional action. Nonpositional consciousness is pre-reflective; therefore, Sartre describes it as a pre-reflective cogito (cogito pre-reflexif). This pre-reflective cogito precedes and becomes the foundation for the Cartesian cogito. Positional consciousness, on the other hand, is reflective in character, directed toward some intentional object. Sartre has taken over Husserl’s doctrine of intentionality and has made it central to his description of of the positional consciousness. Positional consciousness is always consciousness of something. It is directed outward into a world. But the positional consciousness can also be directed reflexively upon itself. Consciousness can become conscious of itself as being conscious. It is in this way that the ego or the self is posited or derived. Both the world and the ego or self are posited by the projecting activity of the for-itself in its nonpositional freedom, and they become correlative phenomena inextricably bound up at their very source. Without the world there is no ego, and without the ego there is no world. Both the world and the ego are hypostatized through reflection as unifying, ideal limits.
One of the central structural elements of the for-itself is facticity. The for-itself apprehends itself as a lack or decompression of being. It is not its own foundation. It is a “hole” in the heart of being, infected with nothingness, abandoned to a world without justification. It discovers itself thrown into a situation, buffeted by brute contingencies, for the most part superfluous and “in the way”.
Facticity indicates the utter contingency and irrevocable situitionality of the being of the for-itself. Without facticity consciousness could choose its attachments to the world – it would be absolute and unfettered freedom.
But the freedom which the for-itself experiences is always restricted by the situation in which it is abandoned.
Nonetheless, the freedom of the for-itself is a real freedom and even in its facticity the for-itself perpetually relates itself to itself in freedom.
I do not become a bourgeois or a Frenchman until I choose to become such.
Freedom is always present, translating facticity into possibility. In the final analysis the for-itself is totally responsible for its being.
Value and possibility provide two additional structures of the for-itself.
Value is an expression of an impossible striving toward a coincidence of being.
The for-itself perpetually strives to surpass itself toward reunion with the in-itself, thus achieving totality by healing the fundamental rupture in being. But this totality is an impossible synthesis. As soon as the for-itself would become coincident with the in-itself it would lose itself as for-itself. A final totality remains forever unattainable because it would combine the incompati8ble characteristics of the in-itself (positivity and plenitude) and the for-itself (negativity and lack). The impossible striving for reunion gives rise to the unhappy or alienated consciousness. ………
“The being of human reality is suffering because it emerges in being as perpetually haunted by a totality which it is without being able to be it, since it would not be able to attain the in-itself without losing itself as for-itself. Human reality therefore is by nature an unhappy consciousness, without the possibility of surpassing its unhappy state”.
Now possibility, as an immediate structure of the for-itself, provides further clarification of the meaning of the for-itself as lack. The possible is what the for-itself lacks in its drive for completeness and totality. It indicates the not yet of human reality, the openness of its constant striving.
The structures of the for-itself are ontologically rooted in temporality, which provides their unifying ground. This temporality is understood in Sartre’s phenomenological analysis as a synthesis of structured moments. The “elements” or directions of time (past, present, and future) do not constitute an infinite series of nows, in which some are longer and others are not yet. …….. The past nows are no longer real, the future nows are not yet real, and the present now is always slipping away. …….
Following Heidegger, Sartre speaks of time as an ecstatic unity in which the past is still existentially real, the future already existentially real, and in which past and future coalesce in the present. However, Sartre differs from Heidegger in refusing to ascribe ontological priority to the future. No ecstasis of time has any priority over any of the others; none can exist without the other two. ……… ……….
The past provides the ontological foundation for facticity. In a very real sense the past and facticity indicate one and the same thing. ……… ……..
In contrast to the past which has become an in-itself, the present remains a full-embodied for-itself. ….. Strictly speaking, the for itself as present has its being outside of itself – behind it and before it. It was its past and will be its future. The for-itself as present is not what is (past) and is what it is not (future).
The future is a mode of being which the for-itself must stride to be. …….
As the past provides the foundation for facticity, so the future provides the foundation for possibility. The future constitutes the meaning of my present for-itself as a project of possibilities. … It defines me as a for-itself who is always on the way.
The temporalized world of the for-itself is not an insulated world experienced in isolation. In the world of the for-itself the “other” (autrui) have already made their appearance. Hence, the being of the for-itself is always a being-for-others as well. The discussion of the problem of the interrelation of personal selves occupies a lengthy and important part of Being and Nothingness. ……
The “other” is already disclosed in the movements of the pre-reflective, non-positional consciousness.
Shame affords an example of a pre-reflective, disclosure of the “other”, as well as a disclosure of myself as standing before the other. Through shame I discover simultaneously the “other” and an aspect of my being. I am ashamed of myself before the “other”. The “other” reveals myself to me. I need the “other” in order to realize fully all the structures of my being. It is thus that the structures of being-for-itself and being-for-others are inseparable.
In the phenomenon of “the look” (le regard) we find another example of the pre-reflective disclosure of the self and the other. ……
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In the relation of the for-itself with the “other” the body appears as a central phenomenon. ……
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Sartre concludes his phenomenological essay with a restatement and further elucidation of the nature and quality of human freedom, and a delineation of his program of existential psychoanalysis. Freedom is discussed in relation to the will, in relation to facticity, and finally in relation to responsibility. ……
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The question What is being? is not the question What exists? or What is there?. It cannot be answered by producing a list of things that exist. The question is: What exactly have we said about anything when we have said that it is rather than is not?.
In Being and Time (Sein und Zeit, 1927) Heidegger calls What is being? 'the question of being' (Seinsfrage) and the attempt to answer it 'fundamental ontology'. Traditional ontology is the attempt to establish what exists and what does not exist. Fundamental ontology seeks to establish what it is for what is to be. Heidegger thinks that because Western philosophy, since at least Plato and Aristotle, has forgotten and surpressed the question of being in favour of epistemology and traditional ontology, What is it to be? has slipped all too readily into What exists?. The meaning of the Seinsfrage has to be recovered and rethought with pre-socratic purity because our technocratic and means-to-end modes of thinking make us largely oblivious to the puzzlement of just being.
We know that Sartre read and re-read Heidegger, partly in the original and partly in the translation I'Etre et le Temps. In Being and Nothingness Sartre does not answer the Seinsfrage but produces phenomenological descriptions of being. The subtitle of Being and Nothingness is An Essay in Phenomenological Ontology, a concatenation of words which would have made no sense to Husserl because he insists it is necessary to suspend or bracket ontology to engage in phenomenology. For Husserl it is necessary to ignore what is in order to reveal what appears to be - the phenomenon. Sartre eschews Husserl's methodological solipsism and uses Heidegger's fundamental existential category being-in-the-world to characterise our human existence and thus puts phenomenology back into the world. For this reason the philosophy of Being and Nothingness is existential phenomenology.
Sartre thinks there are fundamentally two manners of being: being-for- itself (I'etre-pour-soi) and being-in-itself (I'etre-en-soi). Other modes of being, such as being-for-others, are parasitic on these. Roughly, being-for-itself is subjective being and being-in-itself is objective being. Being-for-itself is the kind of being that pertains to one's own existence. Being-in-itself is the manner in which the world external to one's own reality exists.
More precisely, being-for-itself entails the existence of consciousness, and consciousness of itself. It is that present centre of conscious awareness that each of us finds him or herself to be. It is being in the sense of being someone, the kind of being of which it makes sense to say 'I am it'. Because being-for-itself entails consciousness, it entails that directedness towards the world called 'intentionality' which consciousness entails. Being-for-itself is partly constituted by presence to being-in-itself. It is what it is over and against the world.
Being-for-itself possesses three existential structures: facticity, temporality and transcendence. Facticity is the unchosen condition or situation of the for-itself in which freedom is exercised. Temporality is the totality past, present, future, and transcendence is the controversial fact about being-for-itself: that it is what it is not and is not what it is. Sartre means that I am, in a sense, constantly projected towards the future in my free self-definition.
Being for itself is free and entails a kind of lack or nothingness. Being-for- itself does not so much have choice as is choice. An essential part of my ownmost ontology is my constant capacity to choose, no matter how unpleasant and constrained the choices available. I am a kind of nothingness because there is nothing that I am independently of my self constitution through those choices. My consciousness is a kind of interior phenomenological space of non-being, surrounded by the plentitude of the world.
Being-in-itself is opaque, objective, inert and entails a massive fullness or plentitude of being. Being-in-itself is uncreated, meaning that although it is, it never began to be and there is no cause and no reason for it to be. Being-in-itself is not subject to temporality because past, present and future pertain uniquely to being-for-itself. (However, the human past is in-itself, not for-itself, because it is fixed and unalterable.) Being-in-itself is undifferentiated, solid and opaque to itself and filled with itself. Sartre sums up these ascriptions in the quasi-tautological thought: it is what it is. In being-in-itself there is no difference between its being and its being what it is. Existence and essence coincide.
Sartre thinks all being is contingent. Whatever is might not have been. Whatever is might not have been what it is. As Roquentin realises in Nausea, there might not have been any conscious beings including oneself. There might not have been anything. That there is something rather than nothing is a fact that could have been otherwise. That there is what there is rather than something else is a fact that could have been otherwise. Humanity seeks to evade its contingency in the inauthentic denial of freedom called 'bad faith' described in Chapter 11 below. Sartre thinks that the fundamental human aspiration is to be a synthesis of being-for-itself and being-in-itself, the perpetually frustrated aspiration, in fact, to be God.
In order to appreciate Sartre's distinctions between manners of being, in the passages from Being and Nothingness which follow, it is necessary to pay close and direct attention to one's own existence and the surrounding world. It is not possible to understand them by thinking in any abstract, objective, or quasi-scientific way. They are entailed by phenomenological descriptions, not theories.
The title of Sartre's Being and Nothingness is taken from the opening paragraphs of Hegel's dialectic. In Science of Logic (Wissenschaft der Logik 1812-16) Hegel argues that Being (Sein) and Nothing (Nichts) are the fundamental concepts because without them there are no concepts. Being and nothing are dialectically antithetical because semantically, psychologically and ontologically opposed yet mutually dependent. They are indeterminate because being is pure being and nothing pure nothing. Being and nothing are aufgehoben (synthesised, relieved, abolished, retained, taken up) in becoming (Werden). Becoming is the transition between being and nothingness.
Sartre subjects this clean Hegelian dialectical reasoning to Heideggerian criticism in Being and Nothingness. The phenomenological concept of nothingness is not the dialectical concept of nothingness. Nevertheless, in reading the ways in which nothingness is introduced into the world by being- in-itself it is useful to see Sartre distancing himself from the Hegelian picture.
Sartre takes from Heidegger's Being and Time the idea of the question. In raising the question of being, Heidegger had said that there is no inquiry without an inquirer, no search without a seeker and, in at least a minimal hermeneutic sense, the questioner already knows the answer to the question in order to seek for it. Sartre argues in the passages below from Being and Nothingness that it is questioning that fundamentally discloses nothingness. Nothingness is presupposed by questioning in three ways: The answer to the question may be negative, the questioner is (paradigmatically) in a state of ignorance or non-knowledge, truth is limited by non-truth, or the false. It is Sartre's view that negative existential propositions depend upon non-being or nothingness rather than the reverse. The phenomenological is prior to the linguistic.
Although it is sometimes said about Sartre that he reifies nothingness, writes as though nothing were a thing, or something called 'nothing' exists, it is not his overt or professed view. Indeed, he is conscious of it as a possible misunderstanding and tries to rule it out by saying 'Nothingness is not'. He tries to improve on Heidegger's famous, or infamous, dictum in What is Metaphysics? (Was ist Metaphysik? , 1929) that 'nothingness nihilates' (Das Nichts selbst nichtet ) by saying 'Nothing does not nihilate itself; Nothingness "is nihilated'". Heidegger too is trying to avoid the charge of holding that nothing in some sense exists but Sartre thinks Heidegger makes a mistake in his formulation. By saying 'nothing nihilates' Heidegger imparts an agency to nothing; the power to nihilate, but this agency could hardly be efficacious unless it or that which exercises it existed. Sartre's 'Nothingness is nihilated' does not carry the logical or grammatical connotation of accomplishment. It is a putative affirmation of nothing's non- being logically consistent with that of the Eleatic presocratic philosopher Parmenides (c. 480 BC). Sartre fails to observe that his passive rendering of Heidegger's active voice may have equally incoherently construed nothing as a subject of anihilation, and hence, something that exists.
Nonetheless, it is true according to Sartre that there are absences. There are refusals and denials, acts of imagining that things could be otherwise. For example, in the celebrated passage from Being and Nothingness reproduced below Sartre is expecting his friend Pierre to be in a cafe but Pierre is not there. Sartre encounters nothingness. Sartre wonders whether this is a judgement or thought that Pierre is absent or whether there is an experience of Pierre's absence, an intuition of nothingness. Sartre knows there is a prima facie absurdity in speaking of the experience of nothing. Nothing is not anything, so an experience of nothing would not be an experience of anything. Nevertheless, Sartre decides that it is by sight that the absence of Pierre was detected. There was at least the phenomenon of seeing that Pierre is absent, even if not a seeing of Pierre's absence.
It is as if nothingness existed. Non-being is a component of the real. Nothingness is real even though nothingness is not. We may speak of absent friends, holes in the ground, negative and false propositions, purely imaginary states of affairs, fictional characters as though they existed because nothingness possesses an appearance of being, a being it borrows from being. The appearance of nothingness depends upon the appearance of being. For example, a hole in a wall exists in a borrowed sense because it is nothing over and above the arrangement of the remaining parts of the wall. An earthquake destroys a city and ontologically this is a distribution of beings that to human beings is disastrous. Sartre says after a storm there is no less than before, there is something else. It is the presence of human reality in the world, being-for-itself, that makes the redistributions of beings called 'storms' and 'earthquakes' into cases of destruction.
Nothingness depends upon consciousness. Consciousness depends upon being-for-itself so nothingness is ultimately introduced into the world by being-for-itself. In the cafe, we are aware of the absence of Pierre because we expect to see him there; as a figure against a background. Sartre distinguishes clearly between non-existence that depends on consciousness and non-existence that does not. After all, many people are absent from the cafe. The Duke of Wellington and Paul Valery are absent. But they are only thought to be absent, in the abstract, or not even thought. Pierre's absence is experienced. In these ways, according to Sartre, consciousness is prior to nothingness.
Consciousness is defined by negation. This is partly the modal point that its being and its being what it is depend upon its not being what it is not. It is partly the psychological claim that its imaginative power to negate is one of its essential properties. Unless we could think or imagine what is absent we could not intuit that which is present.
There is a more profound connection between consciousness and nothingness. I am my consciousness and my consciousness is a kind of nothingness; a nothingness at the heart of being. The being of consciousness contrasts with the kind of being of Sartre calls 'en-soi' or 'in-itself. Being-in-itself is massive, opaque, full, dense and inert. It confronts me and it surrounds me. If I try to locate myself as consciousness, in contrast, I am strangely absent. Phenomenologically, I seem to be a subjective region of non-being within the plenitude of being. Consciousness is a kind of emptiness or non-being. Consciousness is certainly not one object amongst others that I could encounter in the course of my experience. Sartre thinks nothingness distances me from being-in-itself and I am nothing but consciousness of being.
Sartre often speaks as though consciousness is a kind of nothingness or emptiness. Sometimes he says consciousness is a prerequisite for nothingness. Sometimes he says nothingness confronts consciousness. For example, when in Being and Nothingness he says consciousness is total emptiness because the whole world is outside it, he implies that consciousness is a kind of non-being, an absence of being-in-itself. All these views may be exhibited as mutually consistent. Sartre is establishing a hierarchy of dependencies between kinds of absence. Consciousness is a kind of absence that depends on being: being-in-itself. Consciousness essentially involves the power of negation: the possibility of denial through imagination. This in turn makes possible the experience of absence as a kind of quasi-being.
It is through its power of negation that consciousness distinguishes itself from its own objects. This distinction makes possible consciousness' intentionality which, as we saw in the last two chapters, is essential to what consciousness is.