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Index:
Adler
on Loyalty
Dear Dr. Adler,
This is a time when loyalty is publicly
questioned and affirmed. We require loyalty oaths
of teachers and even of students in some cases. Is
there some essential connection between loyalty and
a formal oath? Is loyalty solely a matter of being
for or against a certain system of government, or
does it cover a broader area? What about loyalty to
principles or to persons?
Dr. Adler responds:
Loyalty is faithful adherence to a personal
commitment or pledge. It involves a bond between
persons or allegiance to some cause or principle. A
loyal person is faithful to this bond, and he
demonstrates this in action, service, and
sacrifice. Loyalty is not mere sentiment or
opinion, but is embodied in actual life.
But service is not servility, and loyalty is not
mechanical obedience. It is willingly given, with a
person's whole heart and soul. A person adheres
freely and firmly to what he values as good and
true -- not to what is imposed on him by public
opinion.
Loyalty may be sealed by an explicit promise.
Instances of this are the medieval pledge of
fealty, the marriage vow, and the oath of
allegiance to one's country. The primary meaning of
loyalty is faithful adherence to one's word. But
the promise need not be explicit or verbal, and
one's word may be all the more binding when it is
not uttered. The signs of loyalty, like those of
love, need not be worn on one's sleeve.
Loyalty usually concerns some kind of human
community. It binds friends, members of a family,
citizens of a political community, and adherents of
a religious faith. We have become so concerned with
political loyalties that we have forgotten about
the other types of human fidelity. We forget that
loyalty once meant conjugal fidelity, faithfulness
to one's plighted troth. Desdemona rightly tells
Othello that she is his "true and loyal wife."
Loyalty becomes a serious problem when there is
a conflict of loyalties. The conflict between
religious loyalty and political loyalty has been
frequently dramatized in literature and history.
The early Christians put adherence to their faith
higher than obedience to the emperor's decrees.
American abolitionists put loyalty to the moral law
higher than obedience to the Constitution.
Anti-Nazi Germans plotted against their government
and aided enemy countries in World War II, on the
ground of a higher loyalty. The Christians, the
abolitionists, and the anti-Nazis were, of course,
considered subversive and disloyal by the civil
authorities.
The American philosopher Josiah Royce deals with
this problem in his book on loyalty. He considers
loyalty the supreme moral virtue, the fulfillment
of the moral law. Without it, says Royce, a man is
nothing, for he lacks a moral center for his life.
Loyalty is a universal good which binds men to the
moral order and to one another. Hence, a conflict
of loyalties is disastrous. It is like a civil war
in the moral order.
True loyalty, according to Royce, never requires
the destruction or frustration of another person's
loyalty. He advises respect for loyalty wherever it
appears, even when it is directed to a cause that
we oppose. Royce advocates a "loyalty to loyalty"
and envisions an ideal moral community where all
loyalties harmonize.
Let us apply Royce's concept to present-day
problems of loyalty. A state which requires its
citizens to violate their deepest religious and
moral convictions is guilty of a disloyalty to
loyalty. That is why we respect the right of
conscientious objection to military service or to
saluting the flag.
Our system of government does not require
citizens to accept any particular social or
economic doctrines. The late Wendell Willkie
pointed out that we abolished chattel slavery -- a
traditional form of private property -- within our
Constitutional framework. And the Supreme Court has
proclaimed that no official is empowered to
prescribe what we should believe or to punish us if
we do not accept the dominant beliefs. Loyalty is
not conformity.
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Adler
on Politics and Progress
The highest good, which is self-sufficing
because it is the ultimate or final good that
leaves nothing more to be rightly desired, is
happiness, ethically understood as a whole life
that is well lived in accordance with moral virtue
and one that is blessed by good fortune. Hence, if
the state serves the greatest good, which is also
the complete good, the state is the association
that comes into existence for the sake of a good
human life. Man is by nature a political animal who
can live well only in the state -- that is, in a
civil and civilized society.
Man, being a social as well as a political
animal, lived in families and tribes or villages
before states came into existence. The state served
better the purposes also served by families or
tribes and villages (i.e., the perpetuation of the
species and the needs of subsistence). But beyond
that, the state or civil society enabled man not
just to live, but to live well.
Human nature is the foundation of political and
moral philosophy (ethics), and the same ultimate
good is the controlling end in both. Ethics is thus
the architectonic discipline in the practical
order, and a sound political philosophy is both
founded on ethical truths as well as guided by
them.
What in our universities is called political
science is a descriptive discipline and value-free,
but political philosophy is concerned with
prescriptive truths and so is not value-free.
Another way of saying this is that it sets before
us the ideals we ought to seek in framing and
operating our political and economic institutions.
Liberty, equality, and justice (with justice
limiting liberty and equality) are the chief values
that enter into the political ideal, which calls
for the maximization of these values.
The difference between ethics and political
philosophy is that the latter does not remain the
same in all centuries, but changes with alterations
in the political and economic institutions that
human beings innovatively establish. There is
progress in political philosophy, whereas there is
little or none in ethics. Errors and inadequacies
of political philosophy occurred in antiquity and
the Middle Ages. They were corrected by advances
made in modern times, advances occasioned by the
institutional changes that occurred.
This is not to say that some of the basic
prescriptive truths in political philosophy are not
to be found in Plato and Aristotle; nor that errors
in political philosophy (such as the notion of the
social contract and the error of thinking that the
good of the state is superior to the human good)
have not occurred in modern times. But for the most
part, progress in political philosophy lies in
correcting ancient errors and remedying the
inadequacies that could not have been avoided in
earlier centuries.
In fact, it may be said that political
philosophy is the only dimension of philosophy in
which great progress has been made and is still to
be made in the future.
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Adler
on the Treatment of the
Aged
Dear Dr. Adler,
The problem of the aged citizens of our society
is of urgent concern. It has been commented on by
social workers, political leaders, and other
interested persons. Did societies in the past have
this problem? What was the position of the aged in
former times? Do the great writers of the past have
anything illuminating to offer us on this vital
matter?
Dr. Adler responds:
The attitude toward the elderly has varied in
different times and cultures. In general, the aged
have been held in great respect and even veneration
in primitive and ancient societies. Old age was
regarded as the time of wisdom and spiritual power.
Rule by the elders in both the political and the
religious community was a common practice.
The present problem of what to do about our
senior citizens is unique. It arises from the
technological and social changes of the past
hundred years. Man's life span has been lengthened,
but his services to the economy have been rendered
unnecessary in the extra years he has gained. The
aged have become supernumeraries in our society. We
have substituted gerontology (the study of the aged
and their problems) for gerontocracy (rule by the
aged). The writers of the past have no advice to
offer us on our special problem, for they never
faced it, not even as a possibility. Montaigne, in
the sixteenth century, notes that most men do not
live beyond forty. The aged, as a numerous class,
were no problem.
However, we do find passages from the ancient
poets which resemble our own sense of the plight of
the aged. In one of Sophocles' plays, the chorus of
elders calls old age dispraised, infirm,
unsociable, unfriended. Another chorus, in a play
by Aristophanes, laments: We who have lost our
music, feeble nothings, dull, forlorn.
Jonathan Swift, in Gullivers Travels,
also paints a grim picture of old age. On the
mythical island of Luggnagg, a few people in each
generation live on to an everlasting old age. In
addition to being opinionative, peevish, covetous,
morose, vain, talkative, incapable of friendship
and dead to all natural affection, they can
remember only what they learned in their earlier
years, and even that incorrectly. At the age of
eighty, they are held legally dead, given a small
pension, and regarded as incapable of employment or
business transactions.
Some philosophers of antiquity, such as Plato
and Cicero, take a brighter view of old age. They
see it as the period when intellectual activity and
wisdom are at the highest and replace the waning
physical powers and enjoyments. They also regard
old age as the time when practical judgment is at
it's best and men are most qualified to direct
public affairs. The study of philosophy, according
to Plato, should not begin until after fifty.
Montaigne, on the other hand, maintains that we
are fully formed by the time we are twenty, do our
best work before we are thirty, and decay
thereafter in everything, including our mind. He is
skeptical of the traditional view that we increase
in understanding and wisdom as we get older, and
believes, rather, that we get duller. He proposes,
however, various psychological stratagems for
overcoming the stupefaction of old age, and holds
out the hope that our sensual tastes and
appreciation can be developed as we grow older.
Many writers insist that the lapses in memory,
acuteness, and interest which are supposed to
afflict the aged can be avoided or overcome. Samuel
Johnson contends vehemently that the loss of mental
acuteness is the result of weak will and laziness,
not of old age.
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Adler
on Good and Evil
The basic pairs of words in moral philosophy are
"good and evil" and "right and wrong" I am going to
deal here with only the first of these pairs. (For
the other pair, see Rights, Natural and Civil.)
The word "good" is used in a number of senses.
The first is its use as an adjective, with a
comparative and a superlative, as in good, better,
best. This is its grading sense, in which things
are judged for their exchange value. It is of
little interest to the moral philosopher except in
its use with regard to the summum bonum or the
highest good, the best among all the real goods
that are objects of desire (See Ends and
Means.)
Another sense of the word is its use as a noun,
when it refers to all the goods that are objects of
desire, the real and apparent goods, the goods
needed and wanted.
Finally, there is a sense that is unfamiliar to
most individuals. This is the ontological good --
the intrinsic perfection that everything which
exists possesses. Here, as Augustine tells us, a
mouse has a perfection or goodness that is greater
than that possessed by an inanimate stone like a
pearl. Living organisms have more intrinsic
perfection, than inanimate and inert things, even
though the latter may have greater value in the
marketplace.
In this ontological sense of goodness only God,
that which no greater can be thought of, has
perfection as the supreme being. Only God is
perfectly good, and only complete nonbeing is
absolutely evil. For everything to exist at all is
to have some ontological goodness. What ever exists
has some grade of perfection in the hierarchy of
beings.
In the angelic hierarchy, the seraphim Lucifer
has the greatest perfection among all God's
creatures, and it is that which tempts Lucifer to
commit the sin of pride in wishing to know God as
God knows himself. With the fall of Lucifer and the
other angels that follow him, Lucifer becomes
Satan, morally, not ontologically, the most evil of
all creatures.
This is a clear example of the separation of
moral evil from ontological perfection. A morally
sinful human being still has, in terms of
ontological goodness, the highest grade of
perfection among living organisms on earth.
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Adler
on Virtue and Vice
These two words as used in everyday speech have
acquired strange and even wrong meanings. The word
"virtue," for example, is still often identified
with a woman's chastity though with the advent of
the women liberation movement, that strange meaning
either has disappeared or will soon do so.
From a philosophical point of view, the words
"virtue" and "vice" are definitely misused when
they are used in the plural. Most people think that
there are many virtues and vices, and that is
possible for a person to be virtuous in certain
respects, though not in others.
In the first place, we must distinguish between
intellectual virtues (in the plural) and moral
virtue (in the singular).
There are five intellectual virtues, three of
them in the sphere of knowing (science,
understanding,and wisdom) and two of them in the
sphere of making and acting (skill and prudence).
It is possible to have one or another of these
intellectual virtues without having all of them.
Prudence, which is sometimes called practical
wisdom, is also one of the four cardinal aspects of
moral virtue (temperance, courage or fortitude,
justice, and prudence.)
Readers should note that I referred to the
aforementioned aspects of moral virtue, not to them
as if they were existentially separate virtues; as
if we could be temperate without also being
courageous, or as if we could be just without also
being prudent.
The basic point here is that moral virtue is one
habit -- a habit of right desire that has four
distinct but existentially inseparable aspects.
Moral virtue is acquired and formed by repeated
morally good acts. But an individual who possesses
the basis of moral virtue to any degree may commit
morally wrong acts without losing his or her moral
virtue. The habit may be weakened by such wrongful
actions, if they are committed too frequently, just
as it may be strengthened and fortified by repeated
morally good acts.
Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics is the
only sound, practical, and undogmatic moral
philosophy in which the pivotal notion is habit. It
is a moral philosophy without rules.
Aristotle is the only philosopher who affirms
the unity of moral virtue, and thus explains how
moral virtue is at once self-regarding and
other-regarding, at once selfish in its motivation
and altruistic.
For our own good, our own happiness, we have to
be temperate and courageous, and for the happiness
of others, we have to be just in our habitual
actions toward them. The other basic notions in
Aristotle's ethics are real and apparent goods,
needs, and wants (natural and acquired
desires).
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Adler
on Political Leadership
We may get some notion of the nature of
leadership and the qualities we look for in a
leader by paying attention to the various meanings
that the verb "to lead" evokes in our mind. First,
"to lead" means to be physically out in front, as
when we refer to the lead car in a procession.
Second, "to lead" refers to a skilled human action,
as when we speak of a trained guide leading a party
to its destination. Third, "to lead" means to have
the authority to command or direct others.
The first type of leadership is often found in
our community organizations, in which the leader is
chosen not for any special excellence but only as a
figurehead to "front" for the group. This very
attenuated type of leadership is usually rotated
among different members of the group.
The second type of leadership, is found in
educational and religious institutions. The concept
of the teacher as a guide on the road to learning
is a case in point. Some religious groups refer to
their heads as their "spiritual leaders."
The third type of leadership is the kind that we
look for in the political community. It has been a
subject of discussion in the great books for
thousands of years. You may remember that Plato
wants the leader of his ideal republic to be a
philosopher-king, combining all the moral and
intellectual virtues, and possessing both
philosophical and practical wisdom.
The aristocratic ideal of leadership-that the
best man or men should govern-is an element in most
ancient political theories. A certain excellence in
mind and character was looked for in the men who
were to lead the community. In the early forms of
society, the wisdom and experience required for
leadership were deemed to reside in the elders of
the community.
Our experience with dictatorships in this
century has made us rather leery about
self-appointed leaders. The writings of Mussolini
and Hitler are full of praise for the "leadership
principle," and they even chose the title of
"leader" for themselves. But leaders who are above
the law or are a law unto themselves abuse this
principle. Political philosophers ever since
Aristotle have been aware that even leadership by
the best men must be limited by constitutional
safeguards to prevent it from degenerating into
tyranny. Only under constitutional government, in
which the leader is the first among equals, can
freedom be preserved.
A special problem occurs in modem democracy with
its representative form of government. Are the
representatives of the people to be mere servants
who follow the will of the voters who elect them,
or are they to follow their own judgment on public
measures? Should the representatives mold or follow
public opinion?
The writers of The Federalist and John
Stuart Mill hold that the representative should be
chosen for his superior wisdom and experience, and
should make his own decisions. The opposite opinion
is that the winner of an election bears a mandate
from the voters to carry out specific measures.
The qualities we look for in a political leader
are much the same now as they have always been. He
must be interested primarily in the good of the
community rather than in his own advancement. He
must have sound practical judgment and whatever
special skill and knowledge is required for the
particular task. He must have decisiveness and the
courage to take the risk of being wrong or becoming
unpopular. And, above all, he must have the ability
to inspire trust and confidence.
One of the main obstacles to good political
leadership is the reluctance of the best men to
assume the burdens of public office. Writers as far
back as Plato and Aristotle remark on this. Some
people are of the opinion that every crisis in
American history has called forth the proper
leader. Washington and Lincoln are outstanding
examples.
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